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Throughout American history untold numbers of people have concealed their true racial 
identities and assumed a white racial identity in order to reap the economic, political, 
and social benefits associated with whiteness.  This phenomenon is known as passing. 
While legal scholars have thoroughly investigated passing in its conventional form, the 
inverse process of reverse passing—the process in which whites conceal their true racial 
identity and present themselves as nonwhite—has not been closely investigated within 
legal scholarship.
Rachel Dolezal provides a timely study of the process of reverse passing.  Dolezal—an 
Africana Studies Instructor and head of the Spokane, Washington NAACP—was outed 
as being white after years of phenotypically and culturally presenting herself as a Black 
woman.  Dolezal’s “outing” generated much popular debate and scholarly discourse, most 
of which tended to frame her actions as a one-off occurrence by a deviant actor.  This 
Article argues instead that her actions were evidence of a deeper structure of incentives 
rooted in the U.S. Supreme Court’s affirmative action jurisprudence.
Though reverse passing is often framed as deviant or irrational, this Article demonstrates 
how the Supreme Court’s affirmative action jurisprudence creates tangible and 
intangible incentives for white actors to identify as nonwhite.  It suggests that the Court’s 
entrenchment of the diversity rationale as the primary compelling state interest that 
can be used to justify race-conscious affirmative action programs generated situational 
value in nonwhiteness.  That situational value in nonwhiteness now creates incentives 
that previously did not exist for whites to reverse-pass in order to obtain access to 
opportunities in education, employment and beyond.
This Article is the first to coin, analyze, and propose a theory of reverse passing.  It also 
deepens the rich and rising scholarship examining performance theory and the pliability 
of racial identity.  Finally, given the reconsideration of the diversity rationale by the 
Supreme Court in Fisher v. University of Texas at Austin, this Article also provides an 
opportunity to critically examine the merits and shortcomings of the diversity rationale.
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INTRODUCTION 
Color, for anyone who uses it . . . is a most complex, calculated, 
and dangerous phenomenon. 
—James Baldwin, THE PRICE OF THE TICKET1 
All the world’s a stage, 
And all the men and women, merely Players; 
They have their Exits and their Entrances . . . . 
—William Shakespeare, As You Like It2 
American history, and legal literature, is saturated with analysis of the 
customary “passing” narrative.  Passing is the phenomenon whereby nonwhites 
present themselves as white,3 while their “underlying identity is not altered, but 
hidden.”4  Since the inception of slavery through the present day, passing has 
been prominent within the scholarly literatures, popular media, and indeed, the 
collective American imagination. 
Until recently, racial passing in the other direction—from white to 
nonwhite—has garnered little to no attention, particularly by legal scholars and 
commentators.5  Although precedents for “reverse passing” exist, Rachel 
Dolezal and her outing as a white woman6 thrust this burgeoning phenomenon 
  
1. James Baldwin, Color, in THE PRICE OF THE TICKET: COLLECTED NON-FICTION 1948–
1985 319, 322 (1985). 
2. William Shakespeare, As You Like It, in COMEDIES, HISTORIES, & TRAGEDIES: A 
FACSIMILE OF THE FIRST FOLIO 185, 194 (1623). 
3. The passing literature is also rich within the social sciences, particularly in the area of 
sociology, history, and social psychology.  See, e.g., ALLYSON HOBBS, A CHOSEN EXILE: A 
HISTORY OF RACIAL PASSING IN AMERICAN LIFE (2014); Reginald Daniel, Passers and 
Pluralists: Subverting the Racial Divide, in RACIALLY MIXED PEOPLE IN AMERICA 91 
(Maria P.P. Root ed., 1992); James E. Conyers & T. H. Kennedy, Negro Passing: To Pass or 
Not to Pass, 24 PHYLON 215 (1963); Randall Kennedy, Interracial Intimacies: Sex, Marriage, 
Identity, Adoption, 17 HARV. BLACKLETTER L.J. 57 (2001).  A recent study defined racial 
passing as “a phenomenon in which a person of one race identifies and presents himself or 
herself as another (usually white).”  Nikki Khanna & Cathryn Johnson, Passing as Black: 
Racial Identity Work Among Biracial Americans, 73 SOC. PSYCHOL. Q. 380, 380 (2010). 
4. Kenji Yoshino, Covering, 111 YALE L.J. 769, 772 (2002).  Yoshino distinguishes passing 
from “assimilation” and “covering,” defining assimilation as an “attempt[] to change or hide her 
identity” and covering as strategic concealment of stigmatized aspects of identity.  Id. at 772. 
5. See generally Cheryl I. Harris, Whiteness as Property, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1707 (1993) 
(discussing the property value attached to whiteness, and the legal and de facto incentives 
attached to passing as white); Randall Kennedy, Racial Passing, 62 OHIO ST. L.J. 1145 
(2001) (presenting a legal analysis of passing from Black to white, combined with a 
comprehensive legal history of passing narratives from the early and mid-twentieth century). 
6. See, e.g., Justin Wm. Moyer, ‘Are You an African American?’ Why an NAACP Official Isn’t 
Saying, WASH. POST (June 12, 2015) http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/morning-
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and its corollary questions about and the fluidity of racial identity and the con-
cept of “transracialism” to the forefront.7  Through this tragic archetype, the 
process of reverse passing was broadly exposed, became the subject of unprec-
edented attention, and sparked novel questions about the fluidity of race and 
the malleability of racial identity. 
To be sure, Rachel Dolezal provides a noteworthy case study.  Dolezal 
was born a white woman.  The daughter of two white parents from Lincoln 
County, Montana, Dolezal’s ancestry was “Czech, German and a few other 
things.”8  By her own account, Dolezal was fascinated by and identified with 
Black9 culture from a very early age.10  She eventually obtained a graduate de-
gree in fine arts with a focus on Black narrative painting from Howard Uni-




7. We define transracialism as an individual of one race deliberately deserting his or her 
original racial identity for one of their choosing.  A critique of transraciality is the subject of 
Part IV of this Article. 
8. Krissah Thompson, Passing in Reverse: What Does an NAACP Leader’s Case Say About Race?, 
WASH. POST (June 12, 2015) https://www.washingtonpost.com/lifestyle/style/passing-in-
reverse-what-does-rachel-dolezal-tell-us-about-race-today/2015/06/12/76a377a8-112d-
11e5-a0dc-2b6f404ff5cf_story.html [https://perma.cc/K3CJ-TVKH]; see Lincoln Co. Mom 




9. When using the term “Black,” we use the upper-case “B” to reflect the view, articulated by 
other scholars, that Black people are a specific cultural group and that the term “Black” is 
worthy of being capitalized as a proper noun.  See Kimberlé Williams Crenshaw, Race, 
Reform, and Retrenchment: Transformation and Legitimation in Antidiscrimination Law, 101 
HARV. L. REV. 1331, 1332 n.2 (1988) (“When using ‘Black,’ I shall use an upper-case ‘B’ to 
reflect my view that Blacks, like Asians, Latinos, and other ‘minorities,’ constitute a specific 
cultural group and, as such, require denotation as a proper noun.”); Harris, supra note 5, at 
1710 n.3 (same); Catharine A. MacKinnon, Feminism, Marxisim, Method, and the State: An 
Agenda for Theory, 7 SIGNS 515, 516 intro. n. (suggesting that the letter “B” in Black should 
be capitalized because Black is not “merely a color of skin pigmentation, but . . . a heritage, 
an experience, a culture and personal identity . . .”). 
10. See, e.g., Katie Zavadski, How Did White Rachel Dolezal Convince Everyone She Was Black?, 
DAILY BEAST (June 12, 2015, 9:28 AM), http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/ 
2015/06/12/how-did-this-white-woman-convince-everyone-she-was-black.html [https:// 
perma.cc/8GZC-B977] (noting that Dolezal emphasized her lifelong identification with 
black identity by posting an alleged early childhood drawing that depicted a girl with brown 
skin and black braids). 
11. See Susan Svrluga, Rachel Dolezal Sued Howard for Racial Discrimination. Because She Was 
White, WASH. POST (June 15, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/grade-
point/wp/2015/06/15/rachel-dolezal-sued-howard-for-racial-discrimination-because-she-
was-white [https://perma.cc/JQM4-Z6PJ]. 
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Despite her purported identification with Black culture, Dolezal’s tenure at 
Howard University was marred by controversy.  She sued the University for dis-
crimination, alleging that she was denied teaching positions and scholarship aid, 
received less favorable placements for her artwork, and was subject to a racially 
hostile environment because she was white.12  Dolezal’s lawsuit was ultimately 
dismissed after the Court of Appeals found that she failed to demonstrate 
that the treatment she received was because of her race, or that she was sub-
ject to a racially hostile work environment.13 
After her lawsuit was dismissed, Dolezal’s relationship with Black culture 
shifted markedly from one of purported identification to one of full-fledged as-
sumption.  She gradually shed her white identity for one of a “light-skinned 
black woman,”14 but devoid of the ancestry, biological ties, and the “lived ex-
perience” associated with the latter.15  Dolezal left her past, parents, and for-
mer life behind,16 strategically piecing together a new identity with the 
experiences, opportunities, and profile “identifying as Black” offered.17  Exit 
Rachel Dolezal the white woman. 
  
12. Moore v. Howard Univ., No. 04-CV-234, at *4 (D.C. Cir. June 14, 2005). 
13. Id. at *3. 
14. Charles M. Blow, Opinion, The Delusions of Rachel Dolezal, N.Y. TIMES (June 17, 2015), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/18/opinion/charles-blow-the-delusions-of-
dolezal.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/H4WY-45YD]. 
15. We define “lived experience,” a term vital to this Article’s analysis, to encompass how the 
state and society broadly perceive and treat an individual based on the racial identity into 
which they were born.  While race is a social and political construction, that tenet does not 
extinguish our position that racial identities and classifications must still bear some 
biological nexus to a specific race, which is key to shaping one’s lived experience.  
Furthermore, racial identity is not merely a physical or phenotypic representation, but is 
undergirded by a body of lived experiences that are instrumental to developing that racial 
identity.  Race, therefore, is also an experience rooted in biology, not merely phenotype or 
physical appearance, as suggested by the U.S. Supreme Court’s diversity doctrine.  See 
Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 315 (1978) (noting that racial or ethnic 
orgin is an important element of the compelling state interest in diversity that can justify the 
use of race-conscious admissions programs). 
16. For a chronological account of Dolezal’s ‘transformation’ from a white to Black identity, see 
Meghan Keneally, Rachel Dolezal: A Timeline of the Ex-NAACP Leader’s Transition From 
White to ‘Black’, ABC NEWS (June 16, 2015, 1:01 PM), http://abcnews.go.com/US/rachel-
dolezal-timeline-naacp-leaders-transition-white-black/story?id=31801772 
[https://perma.cc/MZ5P-2ALJ]. 
17. See Eun Kyung Kim, Rachel Dolezal Breaks Her Silence on TODAY: ‘I Identify as Black’, 
TODAY NEWS (June 16, 2015, 5:46 AM), http://www.today.com/news/rachel-dolezal-
speaks-today-show-matt-lauer-after-naacp-resignation-t26371 [https://perma.cc/33QG-
22R5].  Devon Carbado and Mitu Gulati would label this process of piecing together a new 
identity as “image construction,” and indeed is an extreme illustration of it.  Devon W. 
Carbado & Mitu Gulati, Working Identity, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 1259, 1277 (2000). 
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Enter Rachel Dolezal the Black woman.  Dolezal tanned her skin, rotated 
through several hairstyles traditionally associated with Black womanhood,18 
helmed the Spokane chapter of the National Association for the Advancement 
of Colored People (NAACP), and obtained an adjunct lecturer position at East-
ern Washington University in Africana Studies.19  She held herself out to the 
world as a Black woman.  Short of explicit declarations of Blackness, her myr-
iad roles and associations bespoke a racial identity that she was not assigned at 
birth.  Dolezal’s racial presentation was successful until she was publicly outed 
on June 11, 2015 by a Spokane, Washington reporter who produced a picture 
of Dolezal’s parents and presented it to her on camera.  This caused Dolezal 
to retreat from the lens,20 and in the coming days recoil from the racial duplic-
ity she maintained for years.21 
Even after being outed as white, Dolezal maintained—without biologi-
cal or ancestral basis—that she was Black.  “It’s not a costume . . . It’s not 
something that I can put on and take off anymore,” she proclaimed days after 
her public outing.22  On NBC’s Today Show, Dolezal stated that, “I identify as 
Black,” to Matt Lauer and a captive American audience,23 marking that her 
campaign to reverse pass—from white to Black—was complete.  For Dolezal, 
Blackness is more than a racial costume.  It is an identity she can fully assume 
on account of some deep-seated, existential affinity.  Presumably, it is also an 
identity she can shed if her affinity towards Blackness wanes, or is trumped by 
a competing identity. 
  
18. Paulette Caldwell examined the significance of hairstyling choices and how they relate to 
cultural identification for Black women, through discussion of Bo Derek wearing cornrows 
in the film “10”.  See Paulette M. Caldwell, A Hair Piece: Perspectives on the Intersection of 
Race and Gender, 1991 DUKE L.J. 365, 379 (1991).  In addition, social psychologists observe 
that “manipulation of phenotype” and “highlighting/downplaying cultural symbols” are 
commonly used strategies for passing and reverse passing.  Khanna & Johnson, supra note 3, 
at 381.  Manipulation of hairstyle is a form of manipulating phenotype.  Id. at 387. 
19. See Brittany Paris, EWU Releases Statement on Rachel Dolezal, KXLY.COM, (June 12, 2015, 
12:50 PM), http://www.kxly.com/news/spokane-news/ewu-releases-statement-on-rachel-
dolezal/33552506 [https://perma.cc/NNF7-65TD]. 
20. KXLY, KXLY Exclusive: Rachel Dolezal Responds to Race Allegations, YOUTUBE (June 11, 
2015), https://www.youtube.com/watch?t=4&v=_7Gb9kK8HGk [https://perma.cc/7ZWZ-
V9PG]. 
21. To be sure, Dolezal’s decision to present herself as a Black woman was rife with deception.  
As explained by Randall Kennedy in Racial Passing, passing necessarily involves “a 
deception that enables a person to adopt certain roles or identities from which he would be 
barred by prevailing social standards in the absence of his misleading conduct.”  Kennedy, 
supra note 5, at 1145. 
22. Allison Samuels, Rachel Dolezal’s True Lies, VANITY FAIR (July 19, 2015, 7:55 PM), 
http://www.vanityfair.com/news/2015/07/rachel-dolezal-new-interview-pictures-exclusive 
[https://perma.cc/X4Q3-8J77]. 
23. Kim, supra note 17. 
288 64 UCLA L. REV. 282 (2017) 
 
Dolezal’s turbulent racial journey is arguably the most prominent and 
examined reverse passing vignette in American history.  But it is hardly the 
only one.  As illustrated in this Article, the Dolezal passage is one of many re-
verse passing stories and, moreover, is representative of only one form of 
many modalities of reverse racial deception. 
Reverse passing, this Article advances, is the process by which whites 
shed their white racial identity in exchange for a nonwhite racial identity.24  
As noted by other legal scholars, most notably Cheryl I. Harris, whiteness 
confers tangible economic, social, and political benefits to those who are clas-
sified as white.25  Indeed, an institutional racial hierarchy exists “in which the 
closer one can approximate whiteness, the better off one is economically and 
socially.”26  Put another way, a racial hierarchy and valuation system exists in 
which white racial classifications are afforded the highest placement and value 
within the hierarchy while racial classifications that are the farthest away from 
whiteness, such as Blackness, are afforded the lowest placement and least value. 
Given this racial hierarchy, “passing” has traditionally been a process 
by which nonwhites have sought to perform and present themselves as 
white in order to escape slavery,27 circumvent racism,28 access new worlds of 
economic and employment opportunity,29 shop and dine,30 investigate 
  
24. Nonwhites might also select and pass into another nonwhite identity (for instance, a South 
Asian man may identity as Black).  However, this Article focuses more broadly on whites 
passing into some nonwhite identity. 
25. See Harris, supra note 5, at 1714 (arguing that white identity is a form of property). 
26. Tanya Katerí Hernández, “Multiracial” Discourse: Racial Classifications in an Era of Color-
Blind Jurisprudence, 57 MD. L. REV. 97, 118 (1998). 
27. See Hobbs, supra note 3, at 29 (noting that “[w]hite skin functioned as a cloak in antebellum 
America” and that many runaway slaves who were able to pass as white “neither imagined 
nor desired to begin new lives as white; they simply wanted to be free”). 
28. See Jerry Kang, Cyber-Race, 113 HARV. L. REV. 1130, 1180 (2000) (arguing that “passing 
has the potential to create a space for creative self-determination and agency: the 
opportunity to construct new identities, to experiment with multiple subject positions, and 
to cross social and economic boundaries that exclude or oppress” (quoting Elaine K. 
Ginsberg, Introduction: The Politics of Passing, in PASSING AND THE FICTIONS OF IDENTITY 
16 (Elaine K. Ginsberg ed., 1996))). 
29. See, e.g., Harris, supra note 5, at 1710–13 (leading with a narrative about her grandmother’s 
decision to pass as white in order to procure a job in a white department store in the 1930s).  
Through her vignette, Harris articulates how passing as white opened up a world of 
opportunities for her grandmother that other Blacks, who were unable to pass, could not 
access.  In addition to these opportunities, Harris examines the attendant risks associated 
with passing, which oblige the passer to convincingly perform whiteness in segregated spaces 
and before gatekeepers, with the gatekeepers being those who decide who can gain entrance 
to a particular institution, such as an employer.   
30. See ST. CLAIR DRAKE & HORACE R. CAYTON, BLACK METROPOLIS: A STUDY OF 
NEGRO LIFE IN A NORTHERN CITY 162 (1945). 
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lynching,31 and, for many passers, to seek liberation and ensure survival.32  
Due to the tangible benefits associated with whiteness and the negative value 
associated with nonwhiteness, persons who are able to racially identity as 
white have every incentive to do so in most contexts. 
This Article suggests that there has been a shift in the valuation scheme 
within the racial hierarchy caused in part by modern affirmative action juris-
prudence.  The shift is a situational one in which—at certain times and in cer-
tain spaces—racial diversity is perceived as a valuable commodity.33  Importantly, 
within this framework, “racial diversity” is conceptualized to mean increasing 
the number of nonwhite persons in a particular space, particularly with re-
spect to coveted university seats and employment opportunities.34  As Nancy 
Leong observes, the concept of racial diversity (or increasing the presence of 
nonwhite persons) gained widespread societal value as a result of the U.S. Su-
preme Court’s Fourteenth Amendment affirmative action equal protection 
jurisprudence.35 
In particular, in the seminal affirmative action case Regents of the Univer-
sity of California v. Bakke,36 the Court held that rather than remedying the gen-
eralized lingering effects of past societal discrimination, diversity is the 
compelling state interest that justifies the consideration of race in college admis-
sions programs.37  In reaching this conclusion, the Court extolled the virtues 
  
31. See generally WALTER WHITE, A MAN CALLED WHITE: THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF 
WALTER WHITE (1948) (profiling a Black man who ventured into the South to investigate 
the lynching of Blacks). 
32. See, e.g., WILLIAM CRAFT, RUNNING A THOUSAND MILES FOR FREEDOM; OR, THE 
ESCAPE OF WILLIAM AND ELLEN CRAFT FROM SLAVERY 29 (1860) (describing the 
development of a plan to escape slavery and noting that once it was successful, they as 
slaves “were free from the horrible trammels of slavery, and glorifying God who had 
brought us safely out of a land of bondage”). 
33. See Nancy Leong, Racial Capitalism, 126 HARV. L. REV. 2151 (2013) (arguing that a system 
of racial capitalism exists in which at times white individuals and predominantly white 
institutions gain social and economic value from having nonwhite people in spaces and 
places that have traditionally been all white). 
34. Id. at 2169 (“Efforts to create racial diversity usually begin—and often end—with increasing 
the number of nonwhite people within a group or institution.”). 
35. Id. at 2161 (“While whiteness today remains a marker of status and therefore a source of value, 
our preoccupation with diversity has caused a shift in the dynamics of valuing race. . . . I trace 
that preoccupation to the Supreme Court’s affirmative action jurisprudence.”). 
36. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978). 
37. Id. at 307–09 (noting that remedying past societal discrimination can only serve as a 
compelling state interest justifying the use of race-conscious affirmative action programs 
when there has been a judicial, legislative, or administrative finding of a constitutional or 
statutory violation). 
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of racially heterogeneous groups38 while diminishing the relevance and pro-
priety of using affirmative action programs as a remedial measure for historic 
discrimination against minority groups.39  Subsequent Supreme Court deci-
sions grappling with affirmative action in higher education, namely Grutter v. 
Bollinger40 and Fisher v. University of Texas at Austin (Fisher I),41 reified the 
notion that racial diversity, rather than remedying the effects of lingering past 
societal discrimination, is the appropriate compelling state interest that justi-
fies the use of race in college admissions programs.42 
The Supreme Court’s affirmative action jurisprudence narrows the con-
sideration of race, and more specifically, nonwhite racial identities, finding it 
compelling only for purposes of diversifying a student body.  Indeed, recent Su-
preme Court jurisprudence addressing race generally, and affirmative action spe-
cifically, readily ignores the salience of race and the differences in lived experiences 
resulting from differing racial classifications.43  By supplanting discrimination 
  
38. Id. at 314 (“Physicians serve a heterogeneous population.  An otherwise qualified medical 
student with a particular background—whether it be ethnic, geographic, culturally 
advantaged or disadvantaged—may bring to a professional school of medicine experiences, 
outlooks, and ideas that enrich the training of its student body and better equip its graduates 
to render with understanding their vital service to humanity.”). 
39. See id. at 295–96 (“[T]he white ‘majority’ itself is composed of various minority groups, most 
of which can lay claim to a history of prior discrimination at the hands of the State and private 
individuals.  Not all of these groups can receive preferential treatment and corresponding 
judicial tolerance of distinctions drawn in terms of race and nationality, for then the only 
‘majority’ left would be a new minority of white Anglo-Saxon Protestants.  There is no 
principled basis for deciding which groups would merit ‘heightened judicial solicitude’ and 
which would not.”). 
40. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003). 
41. Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin (Fisher I), 133 S. Ct. 2411 (2013). 
42. Id. at 2417 (reaffirming the court’s reasoning from Bakke that “[r]edressing past 
discrimination could not serve as a compelling interest, because a university’s ‘broad mission 
[of] education’ is incompatible with making the ‘judicial, legislative, or administrative 
findings of constitutional or statutory violations’ necessary to justify remedial racial 
classification”).  For a critique of the Fisher I decision, and the broader civil rights moment 
in which it came, see Devon Carbado, Kimberlé Williams Crenshaw & Cheryl Harris, Why 
We Can’t Celebrate, NATION (July 8, 2013), http://www.thenation.com/article/why-we-
cant-celebrate [https://perma.cc/LEV6-43LV]; see generally Eang L. Ngov, Following 
Fisher: Narrowly Tailoring Affirmative Action, 64 CATH. U. L. REV. 1 (2014) (examining 
the jurisprudence of narrow tailoring in Fisher I and examining race-neutral alternatives to a 
diminishing race-conscious affirmative action regime). 
43. Indeed, Justice Sonia Sotomayor criticized the Court for its failure to acknowledge both the 
history and lived reality of race and racial difference.  See Schuette v. Coal. to Defend 
Affirmative Action, Integration & Immigrant Rights & Fight for Equal. By Any Means 
Necessary (BAMN), 134 S. Ct. 1623, 1676 (2014) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (“The way to 
stop discrimination on the basis of race is to speak openly and candidly on the subject of 
race, and to apply the Constitution with eyes open to the unfortunate effects of centuries of 
racial discrimination.  As members of the judiciary tasked with intervening to carry out the 
guarantee of equal protection, we ought not sit back and wish away, rather than confront, 
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remediation with diversity as the sole compelling state interest, the Supreme 
Court removed the import of actual “lived experiences,” particularly lived 
experiences of marginalization and discrimination experienced by people of 
color.  The Court instead reduced nonwhite racial identity into phenotype 
and culture.44 
Thus, identity-correlated cultural traits, along with phenotypes that ap-
pear to result in “adequate” racial representation—rather than the lived expe-
riences marred by marginalization and discrimination—became the marker of 
access to the benefits afforded by affirmative action programs.  Such a reduc-
tion of nonwhiteness makes it an identity that some whites can easily per-
form and present45 for purposes of capitalizing on racial identities coveted by 
diversity-driven programming. 
Today, because of the emphasis placed on racial diversity by the Supreme 
Court in its affirmative action jurisprudence,46 nonwhite racial classifications 
  
the racial inequality that exists in our society.  It is this view that works harm, by 
perpetuating the facile notion that what makes race matter is acknowledging the simple 
truth that race does matter.”). 
44. There has been much discussion as to whether the compelling state interest in diversity 
articulated by the Court relates to racial diversity or, instead, to cultural diversity.  See 
Gabriel J. Chin, Bakke to the Wall: The Crisis of Bakkean Diversity, 4 WM. & MARY 
BILL RTS. J. 881, 894 (1996) (suggesting that in the Supreme Court’s decision in Bakke, 
“Justice Powell did not state precisely whether the compelling interest is diversity of race 
or diversity of culture”).  In the absence of a clear articulation by the court as to whether 
cultural or racial diversity is the compelling state interest that justifies race-conscious 
admissions programs, the Court arguably instituted a legal framework that avoids overtly 
allowing racial distinctions to be used by implicitly encouraging cultural diversity to 
serve as a proxy for race to achieve racial and ethnic representation in elite institutions.  
See Robert Post, After Bakke, 55 REPRESENTATIONS 1, 3–4 (1996) (arguing that Powell’s 
opinion in Bakke was meant to work as an ideological rather than functional construct which 
would allow race-conscious affirmative action plans to continue but without compromising core 
values related to individualism). 
45. See Richard T. Ford, Race As Culture? Why Not?, 47 UCLA L. REV. 1803, 1809–10 (2000) 
(“What is silently excluded by this paradigm and explicitly excluded by the Bakke opinion 
[and its progeny] is any acknowledgement that a very recent history of state-sponsored and 
institutional subordination distinguishes the two groups.  The result is that the cultural 
identity of a racial minority group is foregrounded at the expense of the history of racism.”). 
46. Narrowing affirmative action jurisprudence intersects with the political front against 
affirmative action by way of state referenda, introduced first in California in 1998 by way of 
Proposal 209.  Proposal 209 abolished affirmative action in the State of California, and led 
to copycat referenda in Washington State, Michigan, Colorado, Arizona, Wisconsin, and 
Nebraska. See Tuneen E. Chisolm, Sweep Around Your Own Front Door: Examining the 
Argument for Legislative African American Reparations, 147 U. PA. L. REV. 677, 680–81 
(1999) (discussing copycat legislation that emerged in other states and that was inspired by 
California’s proposition 209).  The referenda that abolished affirmative action in Michigan 
(Proposal 2, called the “Michigan Civil Rights Initiative”) was challenged as deceptive in the 
Supreme Court in Schuette v. Coalition to Defend Affirmative Action.  The Court, however, 
upheld the referendum, holding that “[t]here is no authority in the Constitution of the 
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have increased in value to the extent they can be capitalized upon to bring 
about representational diversity.  A critical mass of nonwhites is thought to 
add value through its performative contributions to classrooms, campuses, 
and society.47  These performative contributions are divorced from the 
broader lived and existential dimensions that remedial affirmative action 
programs previously took into consideration when considering nonwhite 
applicants for university admission.  Before Bakke, university affirmative ac-
tion programs for example often took measures to consider how membership 
in a particular racial or ethnic group affected an applicant’s life experience and 
opportunities.48  In particular, such programs sought to level the playing field 
by taking into consideration the effect that discrimination likely had on the 
applicant’s lived experience.49  As a result, these performative contributions 
flattened the meaning of nonwhite racial identities, and converted them into 
more accessible forms for whites to perform and into which they can pass.  In 
short, prevailing affirmative action doctrine, by narrowing the applied defini-
tion of nonwhite racial identity, incentivizes whites who believe they can pass 
as nonwhites to do so to access coveted opportunities, particularly in educa-
tion and employment. 
Consequently, the stakes to “reverse pass” are high for whites.  Such “reverse 
passers”50 seek to access the associated (and perceived) legal and cultural bene-
fits of nonwhite identity concomitant with increased mandates for more diver-
sity.  Although not an entirely new phenomenon,51 recent events—including 
  
United States or in this Court’s precedents for the Judiciary to set aside Michigan laws that 
commit this policy determination to the voters.”  Schuette, 134 S. Ct. at 1638.  For a 
firsthand examination of the campaign against Proposal 2 in Michigan, see generally Khaled 
Ali Beydoun, Without Color of Law: The Losing Race Against Colorblindness in Michigan, 12 
MICH. J. RACE & L. 465 (2007). 
47. See Leong, supra note 33, at 2207–08 (describing the ways in which nonwhites are required 
to perform their identity in order to be seen as valuable and to obtain access to societal 
goods). 
48. See, e.g., WILLIAM G. BOWEN & DEREK BOK, THE SHAPE OF THE RIVER: LONG-TERM 
CONSEQUENCES OF CONSIDERING RACE IN COLLEGE AND UNIVERSITY ADMISSIONS 
4 (1998). 
49. See, e.g., DeFunis v. Odegaard, 507 P.2d 1169, 1175 (Wash. 1973), vacated, 416 U.S. 312 
(1974) (describing a race-conscious affirmative action program employed by the University 
of Washington Law School and noting that “[i]n considering minority applicants, the 
[admissions] committee was guided by a University-wide policy which sought to eliminate 
the continued effects of past segregation and discrimination against Blacks, Chicanos, 
American Indians and other disadvantaged racial and ethnic minority groups”). 
50. This is the term we assign to white subjects who seek to reverse pass as nonwhite. 
51. See Kennedy, supra note 5, at 1189–93; see also Daniel J. Sharfstein, Rachel Dolezal’s ‘Passing’ 
Isn’t So Unusual, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (June 15, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/ 
06/25/magazine/rachel-dolezals-passing-isnt-so-unusual.html [https://perma.cc/LR56-
R83C].  See generally Emily Nix & Nancy Qian, The Fluidity of Race: “Passing” in the 
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the outing of Rachel Dolezal—highlight the possibilities for increased inci-
dences of reverse passing.  While discursively viewed in the media and by many 
scholars as a phenomenon born out of individual autonomy or “transracial” op-
tions and possibilities,52 this Article investigates the law’s—and specifically the 
Supreme Court’s affirmative action equal protection jurisprudence’s—role in 
enabling and incentivizing reverse passing. 
Notably, this Article is the first to formally define reverse passing and con-
ceptualize its operation within the legal and cultural realms.  Building on the rich 
legal and social science literature on traditional passing, where the “classic racial 
passer in the United States has been the ‘white Negro,’”53 this Article analyzes the 
process by which whites assume nonwhite identities to access valuable educational 
or employment opportunities, and spaces and communities preferring nonwhites, 
and to build nonwhite public profiles that augment political influence or social 
prestige. 
By introducing reverse passing—as concept and process—into the legal liter-
ature, this Article deepens the rich and rising scholarship examining performance 
theory and the pliability of racial identity.  Several legal commentators, most nota-
bly Devon Carbado and Mitu Gulati,54 Kenji Yoshino,55 Camille Gear Rich,56 
and Nancy Leong,57 have made significant contributions to the modern literature 
on racial performance theory.  As such, their work is critical to this Article.  Cer-
tainly, as affirmative action continues to be debated within the courts, including in 
the recent decision in Fisher v. University of Texas II,58 reverse passing—as a matter 
  
United States, 1880–1940 (Jan. 1, 2015) (unpublished manuscript), http://aida.wss.yale.edu/ 
~nq3/NANCYS_Yale_Website/resources/papers/NixQian_20150101.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/WJ77-35N2] (discussing the incidence of passing and reverse passing 
during this era). 
52. Blow, supra note 14.  The limits and attendant myths of transraciality are explored in Part 
IV of this Article. 
53. Kennedy, supra note 5, at 1145.  Kennedy continues to define the “white Negro” as “the 
individual whose physical appearance allows him to present himself as ‘white’ but whose 
‘black’ lineage (typically only a very partial black lineage) makes him a Negro according to 
dominant racial rules.”  Id. 
54. See Carbado & Gulati, supra note 17; see also DEVON W. CARBADO & MITU GULATI, 
ACTING WHITE? RETHINKING RACE IN “POST-RACIAL” AMERICA (2013). 
55. See generally Yoshino, supra note 4. 
56. See, e.g., Camille Gear Rich, Essay, Affirmative Action in the Era of Elective Race: Racial 
Commodification and the Promise of the New Functionalism, 102 GEO. L.J. 179 (2013); 
Camille Gear Rich, Decline to State: Diversity Talk and the American Law Student, 18 S. 
CAL. REV. L. & SOC. JUST. 539 (2009) [hereinafter Rich, Decline to State]. 
57. See generally Leong, supra note 33; see also Nancy Leong, Identity Entrepreneurs (Univ. 
Denver Sturm Coll. Of Law Legal Research Paper Series, Working Paper No. 15-10, 
2015). 
58. Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin (Fisher II), 136 S. Ct. 2198 (2016); Transcript of Oral 
Argument, Fisher II, 136 S. Ct. 2198 (2016) (No. 14-981). 
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of scholarly, practical, and popular concern—will only become more pressing and 
prominent. 
This Article proceeds as follows.  The construction of racial hierarchy and re-
verse passing theory are the focuses of Part I, which includes a description of the 
two primary forms of reverse passing: legal and cultural.  Part II analyzes prevailing 
Fourteenth Amendment equal protection jurisprudence in relation to affirmative 
action, which extends the legal catalyst incentivizing reverse passing.  Part III ex-
amines the principal forms of reverse passing—legal and cultural—through an 
analysis of prominent case law and pressing case studies.  Part IV examines the 
dialectic between the law and transracialism, a theory of racial mobility that justi-
fies reverse passing but practically restricts passing in the other direction (nonwhite 
to white). 
I. A THEORY OF REVERSE PASSING 
[T]he reputation of belonging to the dominant race, in this instance 
the white race, is ‘property,’ in the same sense that a right of action or 
of inheritance is property. 
—Justice Henry Brown, Plessy v. Ferguson59 
Examining how race and racial hierarchies were historically constructed and 
maintained in the United States is a critical first step to understanding reverse 
passing theory and its associated concepts.  Part I.A briefly provides such a history.  
Moving forward, Part I.B analyzes a shift in the racial hierarchy in ways that assign 
value to nonwhite racial classifications.  Finally, Part I.C concludes by setting forth 
the necessary theoretical and conceptual groundwork of reverse passing. 
A. The Construction of Race and Racial Hierarchy 
Race is a social rather than a biological construct.60  There is no race gene 
from which racial classifications are drawn.61  Instead, the racial classification 
  
59. 163 U.S. 537, 549 (1896), overruled by Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
60. Ian Haney López offers an apt definition of race, highlighting its fluidity and its relationship 
with formative historical events and experiences: “[R]ace constitutes a socially and legally 
produced hierarchal system structurally embedded in U.S. society.”  Ian F. Haney López, “A 
Nation of Minorities”: Race, Ethnicity, and Reactionary Colorblindness, 59 STAN. L. REV. 985, 
990 (2007).  Haney López offers a descriptive and nuanced overview of the turbulent 
understanding of race, and racial classifications, from Reconstruction through the modern 
“emerging theories of race.”  Id. at 992–1000. 
61. See, e.g., Ian F. Haney López, The Social Construction of Race: Some Observations on Illusion, 
Fabrication, and Choice, 29 HARV. CIV. RTS.-CIV. LIBERTIES L. REV. 1, 11 (1994) (“There 
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system in place today is rooted in the history of American racial slavery, seg-
regation, and exclusion.62  During the early years of the American colonies, 
the colonists were aware of race and racial differences, yet racial classifications 
were fluid and inconsistent.63  Furthermore, race was not linked with social 
status as it is today.64  Blacks in some colonies held the same rights as white 
indentured servants—they were permitted to own property, get married, and 
to live as free individuals after completing their terms of service.65 
  
are no genetic characteristics possessed by all Blacks but not by non-Blacks; similarly, there 
is no gene or cluster of genes common to all Whites but not to non-Whites.”). 
62. See Haney López, supra note 60, at 1032–34 (describing how the legal subordination of 
Blacks allowed the construction of a racial hierarchy in which Blackness is at the bottom); see 
also Richard T. Ford, Urban Space and the Color Line: The Consequences of Demarcation and 
Disorientation in the Postmodern Metropolis, 9 HARV. BLACKLETTER L.J. 117, 134 (1992) 
(“[I]n order for the concept of a white race to exist, there must be a Black race which is 
everything the white race is not (read of course: does not want to be associated with).  Thus, 
the most debased stereotypical attributes of the ‘Black savage’ are none other than the guilty 
projections of white society.”); see also Khaled A. Beydoun, Antebellum Islam, 58 HOW. L.J. 
141, 156–63 (2014), for an analysis of how the Black racial classification was legally 
constructed in direct opposition to whiteness.  For discussion of the “relational” dialectic 
between the construction of whiteness and Blackness within employment, see Martha R. 
Mahoney, Segregation, Whiteness, and Transformation, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 1659, 1662 
(1995) (“Race is a relational concept.  It describes at least two social and cultural groups in 
relation to each other.  The concept of race acquires meaning only in the context of historical 
development and existing race relations.  Therefore, the construction of whiteness as ‘naturally’ 
employed and employable, and blackness as ‘naturally’ unemployed and unemployable, are 
both examples of the way in which concepts of whiteness and blackness imply whiteness as 
dominant and blackness as ‘other.’”). 
63. Harris, supra note 5, at 1716 (“Although the early colonists were cognizant of race, racial 
lines were neither consistently nor sharply delineated among or within all social groups.”). 
64. See, e.g., Neil Gotanda, A Critique of “Our Constitution Is Color-Blind”, 44  STAN. L. REV. 1, 
32 (1991) (noting that “[i]n the early colonial period, racial classifications were highly fluid. 
Social status often depended as much on the labor status of the individual as on his place of 
origin”); Ariela Gross & Alejandro de la Fuente, Slaves, Free Blacks, and Race in the Legal 
Regimes of Cuba, Louisiana, and Virginia: A Comparison, 91 N.C. L. REV. 1699, 1717 (2013) 
(noting that in the pre-antebellum Virginia, “[p]eople appear in legal records designated as 
‘negroes’ who were free or became free after some years of service, so we know that people of 
African descent were not all slaves, and slaves were not all of African descent”). 
65. See JOHN HOPE FRANKLIN & ALFRED A. MOSS, JR., FROM SLAVERY TO FREEDOM: A 
HISTORY OF AFRICAN AMERICANS 167–72 (8th ed. 2000) (describing how some slaves 
during the colonial period were successful in limiting their period of servitude and obtaining 
substantive rights).  Trina Jones, Race, Economic Class, and Employment Opportunity, 72 LAW 
& CONTEMP. PROBS. 57, 63–64 (2009) (“Like indentured servants, the first significant 
number of African slaves arrived in colonial America in the seventeenth century.  The two 
groups share some similarities.  Both were poor and were treated as articles of commerce.  
Both were subject to violence and inhumane treatment at the hands of masters and 
employers.”). 
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This changed as the need for slave labor increased.66  Slave labor was increas-
ingly necessary in order to cheaply cultivate and exploit the vast land within the 
United States.67  Other forms of labor, namely white indentured servitude and 
compelled Native-American labor, proved insufficient and inconsistent.68  A 
steady, stable, and inexpensive supply of labor was needed.69  To that end, 
colonists began to exploit and seize upon racial differences as a justification 
for permanently subjecting Blacks to slavery.70  Indeed, during the 1600s, as 
slavery expanded, Africans were labeled in derogatory terms such as “hea-
then” or “infidel” in order to justify their subordination and the creation of a 
permanent class of slaves.71  Denying religion to enslaved Africans was vital 
to the project of stripping them of their humanity and preventing slave re-
volts.72 
In addition, during this period colonies enacted slave codes that, among oth-
er things, established rules of descent for classifying the offspring of slaves as free 
or slave in accordance with the amount of nonwhite blood the person had, and 
allowed for differential punishment of Black slaves and white indentured 
  
66. See A. Leon Higginbotham, Jr. & Greer C. Bosworth, “Rather Than the Free”: Free Blacks in 
Colonial and Antebellum Virginia, 26 HARV. CIV. RTS.-CIV. LIBERTIES. L. REV. 17, 21 
(1991); see also Angela Onwuachi-Willig, Multiracialism and the Social Construction of Race: 
The Story of Hudgins v. Wrights, in RACE LAW STORIES 147, 149 (Rachel F. Moran & 
Devon Wayne Carbado eds., 2008) (“[A]s a social and financial matter, white Virginians 
viewed slavery as economically rational and necessary.  To their minds, white indentured 
servants were too costly . . . because of social customs that required payment for their work 
with wages and future land grants.”). 
67. See Ralph V. Anderson & Robert E. Gallman, Slaves as Fixed Capital: Slave Labor and 
Southern Economic Development, 64 J. AM. HIST. 24, 27–28 (1977) (“In the New World the 
impetus to rural slavery imparted by abundant supplies of land, a scarcity of labor, and 
opportunities for commercial agriculture was very strong . . . .”). 
68. See DAVID R. ROEDIGER, THE WAGES OF WHITENESS: RACE AND THE MAKING OF 
THE AMERICAN WORKING CLASS 22 (2007). 
69. See Harris, supra note 5, at 1717 (describing the emergence of racial classification and its 
link to slavery, noting that as the colonies expanded “the demand for labor intensified, 
resulting in a greater reliance on African labor and a rapid increase in the number of 
Africans imported into the colonies”). 
70. See Hobbs, supra note 3, at 36 (“During the eighteenth century, racial identity was fluid, and 
race was disaggregated from slave status.  These two categories would not become fully 
intertwined until the early nineteenth century.”); Gotanda, supra note 64, at 33 (“As slavery 
became entrenched as the primary source of agricultural labor, slaveholders developed a 
complementary ideological structure of racial categories that served to legitimate slavery.”). 
71. See Gotanda, supra note 64, at 33. 
72. Nicholas May, Holy Rebellion: Religious Assembly Laws in Antebellum South Carolina and 
Virginia, 49 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 237, 243 (2007) (noting that “most antebellum slave 
revolts made use of religion both as a pretense for insurgent activity and as a source of moral 
justification for the uprising itself,” and that as a result attempts were made to deny religion 
to slaves). 
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servants.73  Consequently, a racial hierarchy emerged in which Blackness was 
linked with bondage and whiteness linked with freedom; in this way, the slave 
codes provided the foundation for the initial racial classification system in 
America.74  The system of racial categorization engendered by the slave codes 
was inextricably intertwined with property rights and property valuation.  To 
be sure: “[A] ‘presumption of freedom [arose] from color’ . . . and the ‘black 
color of the race [raised] the presumption of slavery,’ whiteness [therefore] 
became a shield from slavery, a highly volatile and unstable form of proper-
ty.”75  Put another way, those who were visibly identifiable as white were pre-
sumed to be free, while those visibly identifiable as Black were presumed to be 
slaves.  As described in the sections that follow, the establishment of a racial 
caste system to justify enslaving Blacks resulted in whiteness becoming a deeply 
entrenched property interest that still endures today.  It also resulted in the crea-
tion of the present-day racial hierarchy whereby white supremacy and Black in-
feriority still occupy the top and bottom rungs, respectively, with other racial 
groups vacillating in between.  The following Parts describe in further detail 
how whiteness has been entrenched as a form of property and the parameters 
of the modern day racial hierarchy that exists today. 
1. Whiteness as Property76 
The racial classification system used to maintain and justify slavery roots 
the modern racial taxonomy.77  This taxonomy classified and accorded value to 
races based on their proximity to whiteness.78  Being classified as white shield-
ed individuals from permanent involuntary servitude.79  Indeed, during the 
height of the antebellum period, it was not uncommon for individuals to litigate 
  
73. See Gotanda, supra note 64, at 33–34 (“Besides codifying punishment for slaves who stole or 
ran away, the slave code contained specific rules of descent for classifying offspring.  
Punishments for Blacks and mulattos differed from those for indentured servants.”). 
74. Id. at 34 (“This institutionalization of racial classifications linked to disparate treatment marked 
the first formal establishment of racial categories in colonial America.”). 
75. Harris, supra note 5, at 1720. 
76. See generally id. 
77. See MICHAEL OMI & HOWARD WINANT, RACIAL FORMATION IN THE UNITED 
STATES: FROM THE 1960S TO THE 1980S 68 (1986) (defining “race” as “an unstable and 
‘de-centered’ complex of social meanings constantly being transformed by political 
struggle”). 
78. Hernández, supra note 26, at 115 (arguing that “[w]hiteness and approximations of 
whiteness will always be valued in a society structured on a White/non-White racial 
continuum”). 
79. Harris, supra note 5, at 1717–18. 
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the issue of whether they were white and therefore entitled to freedom.80  Further, 
in addition to freedom, whiteness also afforded individuals a myriad of con-
crete rights and privileges. 
One such important right was American citizenship.  The Naturaliza-
tion Act of 1790 ensured that (naturalized) citizenship for much of this coun-
try’s history was only afforded to those classified as white.81  While the 
definition of which persons could be classified as white changed over time,82 
the requirement that one be classified as white to become a naturalized citizen 
endured for some time.83 
On the other hand, Blacks born into slavery in America were not legally 
considered American citizens until the ratification of the Fourteenth 
Amendment to the Constitution.84  The enactment of black codes and Jim 
Crow immediately after the abolition of slavery severely diminished the “sub-
stantive citizenship” of freed Blacks.85  Vicious state-led segregation circum-
scribed the rights and privileges that come with formal citizenship.86  Native 
Americans were also denied American citizenship for much of the country’s 
history until the passage of the Indian Citizenship Act of 1924.87  In addition, 
  
80. See generally Ariela J. Gross, Litigating Whiteness: Trials of Racial Determination in the 
Nineteenth-Century South, 108 YALE L.J. 109 (1998) (analyzing antebellum trial records of 
individuals who sued to prove their whiteness). 
81. Naturalization Act of 1790, 1 Stat. 103 (1790) (repealed 1795) (“[A]ny alien, being a free 
white person, who shall have resided within the limits and under the jurisdiction of the 
United States for the term of two years, may be admitted to become a citizen thereof . . . .”). 
82. See infra Part I.A.2. 
83. See IAN HANEY LÓPEZ, WHITE BY LAW: THE LEGAL CONSTRUCTION OF RACE 27 
(2006) (“Federal law restricted immigration to this country on the basis of race for nearly 
one hundred years, roughly from the Chinese exclusion laws of the 1880s until the end of 
the national origin quotas in 1965.”). 
84. See Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393, 407 (1856), superseded by constitutional amendment, 
U.S. Const. amend. XIV (“[Blacks are] of an inferior order, and altogether unfit to associate 
with the white race, either in social or political relations; and so far inferior, that they had no 
rights which the white man was bound to respect.” (quoting Justice Taney)). 
85. See LINDA BOSNIAK, THE CITIZEN AND THE ALIEN: DILEMMAS OF CONTEMPORARY 
MEMBERSHIP 31 (2006) (“[T]here is often a gap between possession of [formal] citizenship 
status and the enjoyment or performance of citizenship in substantive terms.”). 
86. See Kenneth L. Karst, Essay, Paths to Belonging: The Constitution and Cultural Identity, 64 
N.C. L. REV. 303, 320–21 (1986) (describing the ways in which state-mandated segregation 
in the South and other parts of the United States denied Black citizens the benefits of 
American citizenship by disenfranchising them and subjecting them to a second-tier caste 
system in housing, education, and employment). 
87. 1924 Indian Citizenship Act, 43 Stat. 253 (1924) (“Be it enacted by the Senate and House of 
Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That all non-citizen 
Indians born within the territorial limits of the United States be, and they are hereby, 
declared to be citizens of the United States: Provided, That the granting of such citizenship 
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immigrants from Asia were prohibited from becoming citizens until the 1954 
McCarran-Walter Act.88  Whiteness was such a valuable asset that courts 
grappled with the very definition of whiteness and which person could or 
could not be classified as white and obtain access to the privileges attendant to 
being classified as white.89   
Importantly, in the absence of citizenship, those who were not classified 
as white were also denied many important benefits for which citizenship was 
a prerequisite.  The rights to vote,90 own property, testify in court,91 and bring 
lawsuits,92 to name a few, were denied to nonwhites. Whiteness, therefore, 
was not merely a racial identity—but also a gateway toward a host of rights, 
privileges, and resources. 
Whiteness remains a deeply entrenched property interest.  Whites have 
sued and sought compensation claiming “wrongful birth” or “emotional dis-
tress” when a sperm bank inadvertently gave a white woman a Black man’s 
  
shall not in any manner impair or otherwise affect the right of any Indian to tribal or other 
property.”). 
88. 8 U.S.C. § 1422 (1952). 
89. In line with the position that race is a social construction, “[b]eing white is not a monolithic 
or homogenous experience, either in terms of race, other social identities, space or time.  
Instead, Whiteness is contingent, changeable, partial, inconstant, and ultimately social.”  
IAN F. HANEY LÓPEZ, WHITE BY LAW: THE LEGAL CONSTRUCTION OF RACE xiv 
(1996).  Whiteness, during the Naturalization era, vacillated between narrow and broader 
constructions, whereby judges subjectively drew upon a range of criteria—eugenics, physical 
appearance, language, geographic origin, religion, and other factors—to find an immigrant 
petitioner within or beyond the statutory definition of whiteness.  A popular position by the 
courts, illustrated in Ozawa v. United States, 260 U.S. 178, 178 (1922), held that whiteness 
was synonymous with Caucasian and “confined to persons of the Caucasian Race,” but the 
court used other measures besides ancestry and etymology to define the basis and bounds of 
whiteness. 
90. The Fifteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution prohibits race-related discrimination in 
voting.  See U.S. Const. amend. XV, § 1 (“The right of citizens of the United States to vote 
shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of race, 
color, or previous condition of servitude.”).  Prior to the enactment of the Fifteenth 
Amendment, the right to vote was strictly limited to white men.  See Virginia E. Hench, The 
Death of Voting Rights: The Legal Disenfranchisement of Minority Voters, 48 CASE W. RES. L. 
REV. 727, 732 (1998) (describing the history of race-based voting restrictions). 
91. See, e.g., People v. Hall, 4 Cal. 399, 404 (1854) (barring the testimony of a Chinese witness 
to a murder committed by a white man, and reasoning that “[t]he same rule which would 
admit them to testify, would admit them to all the equal rights of citizenship, and we might 
soon see them at the polls, in the jury box, upon the bench, and in our legislative halls”). 
92. See, e.g., Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393, 406 (1856), superseded by constitutional 
amendment, U.S. Const. amend. XIV. (1868) (finding that a person of African descent who 
was a slave was not a citizen “within the meaning of the Constitution of the United States, 
and, consequently, was not entitled to sue in its courts”). 
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sperm93 and litigated to have themselves classified as white because of the per-
ceived harm in being classified as anything other than white, especially 
Black.94  Whites with lower levels of education are on average wealthier than 
similarly educated people of color and are more likely to obtain jobs than Blacks 
who graduate from college.95 
For these reasons, nonwhites have passed in order to obtain the political, 
economic and social advantages that are afforded to whites but denied to 
nonwhites.96  Thus, for both whites and nonwhites, whiteness is a valuable 
form of property that whites seek to hold on to and that nonwhites, at times, 
seek to obtain.  The benefits associated with whiteness, therefore, have over-
whelmingly pulled nonwhites to pass in its direction.  Similarly, other nonwhite 
groups,97 such as Arab or Latino Americans, are driven to perform (and 
sometimes reshape) their identities in modes that align with whiteness. 
2. Racial Hierarchal Slope 
Concomitant with the establishment of whiteness as a valuable property 
interest was the creation of a racial hierarchy premised on white supremacy.98  
Within this hierarchy, racial classifications—and the political and social 
  
93. See, e.g., Lindsey Bever, White Woman Sues Sperm Bank After She Mistakenly Gets Black 
Donor’s Sperm, WASH. POST (Oct. 2, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/ 
morning-mix/wp/2014/10/02/white-woman-sues-sperm-bank-after-she-mistakenly-gets-
black-donors-sperm [https://perma.cc/E6WE-RKVV]; Ronald Sullivan, Sperm Mix-Up 
Lawsuit Is Settled, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 1, 1991), http://www.nytimes.com/1991/08/01/ 
nyregion/sperm-mix-up-lawsuit-is-settled.html [https://perma.cc/E7TZ-DHLY]. 
94. See, e.g., Doe v. State, 479 So. 2d 369, 369 (La. Ct. App. 1985) (“Family members sought 
change in racial designation of their deceased parents on state records and filed action 
seeking mandamus to compel Department of Health and Human Resources to correct the 
alleged error.”). 
95. See Michael A. Fletcher, White High School Dropouts Are Wealthier Than Black and Hispanic 




96. See, e.g., Henry Louis Gates, Jr., White Like Me, NEW YORKER, June 17, 1996, at 66, 
(chronicling the story of Anatole Broyard, a man classified as Black by law, but who passed 
as a white man for economic and social purposes). 
97. See Laura E. Gómez, Off-White in an Age of White Supremacy: Mexican Elites and the Rights of 
Indians and Blacks in Nineteenth-Century New Mexico, 25 CHICANO-LATINO L. REV. 9, 
10–11 (2005) (defining off-whiteness as a liminal status in which groups are formally 
classified as white, but do not enjoy a status in society reflective of that designation). 
98. See Gotanda, supra note 64, at 34 (arguing that the American system of racial classification 
“with its metaphorical construction of racial purity for whites, has a specific history as a badge 
of enslaveability.  As such, the metaphor of purity is not a logical oddity, but an integral part 
of the construction of the system of racial subordination embedded in American society.”). 
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benefits attached to them—are distributed on the basis of a white/nonwhite 
scale.99  Whiteness, of course, is situated at the highest end of the spectrum, 
while Blackness occupies the countervailing lower end of the spectrum. 
The Black-white dichotomy upon which the racial hierarchy is predicated 
often leaves those who are not Black or white occupying a “racial middle.”100  
This racial middle exists on a slope in which “the closer one can approximate 
whiteness, the better off one is economically and socially.”101  Put another 
way, persons not categorized as white or Black, such as Latino, Asian, Native 
American and “Middle Eastern and North African” persons,102 are often af-
forded social and political benefits in accordance with their perceived physical 
and cultural associations to whiteness.  Even within nonwhite racial catego-
ries, individuals are often afforded social, economic and political rights in ac-
cordance with the lightness of their skin or how closely it approximates 
whiteness, creating an intra-hierarchy within those groups such that the 
lighter their skin is the more benefits they are afforded.103  Yet whiteness re-
mains the gold standard, as even those nonwhites who are the most closely as-
sociated with whiteness do not receive the full benefits afforded those who are 
classified as white.  For example, Asian-Americans are often portrayed as a 
model minority group that receives benefits that closely rival those received by 
whites.104  Indeed, Asian-Americans as a group earn higher wages than any 
other racial or ethnic group, including whites.105  Yet Asian-Americans as a 
  
99. See Hernández, supra note 26, at 118–19 (describing a racial hierarchy in which social and 
economic benefits are distributed in accordance with how closely one is to whiteness). 
100. See Mari Matsuda, Voices of the Community, 1 UCLA ASIAN AM. PAC. ISLAND L.J. 79, 79 
(1993) (describing Asian Americans as assuming the role of the racial middle). 
101. Hernández, supra note 26, at 118. 
102. See generally Khaled A. Beydoun, Boxed in: Reclassification of Arab Americans on the U.S. 
Census as Progress or Peril?, 47 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 693 (2016) (analyzing the proposed 
“Middle Eastern or North African” (MENA) category for the 2020 Census, which would 
create a standalone classification for Arab Americans and other groups with ancestral ties to 
the regions). 
103. See, e.g., Taunya Lovell Banks, Colorism: A Darker Shade of Pale, 47 UCLA L. REV. 1705, 
1715 (2000) (describing how “members of a racially subordinated group may be 
‘differentially racialized,’ creating different levels of status and power within the group” 
based on skin tone). 
104. See, e.g., Nicholas Kristof, The Asian Advantage, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 10, 2015), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/11/opinion/sunday/the-asian-advantage.html?_r=0 
[https://perma.cc/PAA2-P9HT] (describing the ways in which Asian Americans are 
perceived as an advantaged minority group). 
105. See Asian-Americans Lead All Others in Household Income, PEW RES. CTR., (Apr. 16, 2016), 
http://www.pewresearch.org/daily-number/asian-americans-lead-all-others-in-household-
income [https://perma.cc/MP82-JBBP]. 
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group are still subject to forms of racial discrimination that whites as a group 
are not.106 
Instead, the footing within the racial hierarchy on which the racial mid-
dle exists is arguably very delicate, as those in the middle are still likely to face 
some forms of racial discrimination, and even violence, because of their 
race.107  The proximity to whiteness (and corresponding benefits) afforded 
those who occupy the racial middle is arguably linked to their whiter pheno-
type108 and their willingness to serve white interests.109  Some scholars suggest 
that this results in a “buffer class” of people of color situated between Blacks 
and whites.110  For example, Professor Mari Matsuda notes: 
The role of the racial middle is a critical one.  It can reinforce white 
supremacy if the middle deludes itself into thinking it can be just like 
white if it tries hard enough.  Conversely, the middle can dismantle 
  
106. See Alexis Buchannon, Asian Americans Earn Top Wages Yet Still Face Discrimination, 
NONPROFIT Q. (July 6, 2016), https://nonprofitquarterly.org/2016/07/12/asian-americans-
earn-top-wages-yet-still-face-discrimination/ [https://perma.cc/92U9-3QYE] (describing 
discrimination experienced by Asian Americans with respect to advancement in the 
workplace, particularly within the technology sector). 
107. See Natsu Taylor Saito, Alien and Non-Alien Alike: Citizenship, “Foreignness,” and Racial 
Hierarchy in American Law, 76 OR. L. REV. 261, 310–11 (1997) (chronicling instances of 
violence committed against Asian Americans due to them being characterized as foreigners 
and outsiders); The Model Minority Is Losing Patience, ECONOMIST (Oct. 3, 2015), 
http://www.economist.com/news/briefing/21669595-asian-americans-are-united-states-
most-successful-minority-they-are-complaining-ever [https://perma.cc/5E83-ETV2] 
(chronicling instances of discrimination against Asian Americans in the workplace and in 
college admissions). 
108. Leonard M. Baynes, If It's Not Just Black and White Anymore, Why Does Darkness Cast a 
Longer Discriminatory Shadow Than Lightness? An Investigation and Analysis of the Color 
Hierarchy, 75 DENV. U. L. REV. 131, 152 (1997) (“The closer one is to White standards of 
attractiveness, the better the treatment one is likely to receive.  This truth crosses racial and 
ethnic lines.”). 
109. See, e.g., Saito, supra note 107, at 312 (“Asian Americans have been raced and placed in the 
middle of the American racial hierarchy to help preserve and maintain racial stratification in 
the United States . . . .”).  But cf. Kevin R. Johnson, Racial Hierarchy, Asian Americans and 
Latinos As “Foreigners,” and Social Change: Is Law the Way to Go?, 76 OR. L. REV. 347, 361 
(1997) (challenging the idea that the American racial hierarchy is a static one and instead 
suggesting that “race relations in this country are constantly changing with the various racial 
groups rapidly moving, changing positions, adapting to new conditions, and responding to 
new pressures within and outside of the community”). 
110. See, e.g., Tanya Katerí Hernández, The Construction of Race and Class Buffers in the Structure 
of Immigration Controls and Laws, 76 OR. L. REV. 731, 732–33 (1997) (“[T]he structure of 
immigration laws in the United States has often facilitated the formation and maintenance 
of a middle-tier buffer class of residents to preserve racial hierarchy.”); Chris K. Iijima, 
Reparations and the “Model Minority” Ideology of Acquiescence: The Necessity to Refuse the Return 
to Original Humiliation, 40 B.C. L. REV. 385, 412 (1998) (“[T]here is a growing middle tier 
in which a subordinated ‘model minority,’ Asians and some Latinos, will be given some 
racial and class privileges in return for being used as both a buffer and a diversion.”). 
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white supremacy if it refuses to be the middle, if it refuses to buy 
into racial hierarchy, if it refuses to abandon communities of Black 
and Brown people, choosing instead to form alliances with 
them.111 
Thus for those who occupy the racial middle, while they do not experi-
ence the same detriments associated with Blackness, they are also not afford-
ed the benefits that come with a white racial identity.112  For these reasons, 
passing has traditionally been a process by which both Blacks and other 
nonwhites seek to assume a white identity in order to obtain the benefits as-
sociated with a white classification.113 
B. Shifting Racial Paradigm 
As discussed in previous sections, within the racial hierarchy that was 
created to justify Black chattel slavery, white racial identity has commanded 
the highest value.114  In order to preserve that value, white racial identity is 
carefully guarded and legally protected.  To that end, for the majority of 
American history, civil courts held authority over questions of racial classifi-
cation and belonging.115  Judges were assigned with the task of interpreting 
naturalization statutes that made whiteness a prerequisite for citizenship, and 
enforcing civil and criminal codes that diminished the substantive citizenship 
of nonwhites.116  The dissolution of the Naturalization Era, and the Civil 
Rights Movement that followed, ushered in a new chapter of racial identifica-
tion that made the individual citizen, instead of the state, the decisionmaker 
in racial classification. 
In the Parts that follow, we closely examine the Era of Top-Down Ra-
cial Assignment, which prevailed from 1790–1952,117 followed by the Era of 
  
111. Matsuda, supra note 100, at 79. 
112. See, e.g., Baynes, supra note 108 and accompanying text. 
113. See generally Kennedy, supra note 5 (describing instances in which minorities passed as 
white in order to obtain the benefits afforded to whites and to which they would 
otherwise be denied). 
114. See infra Part I.A.1. 
115. See generally Haney López, supra note 89 (describing the ways in which civil courts adjudicated 
questions of racial identity, particularly with respect to questions of who could or could not become 
naturalized U.S. citizens). 
116. Id. 
117. Id. 
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Racial Self-Identification, or what scholar Camille Rich dubs “elective race,” 
which commenced in 1952 and continues through the current day.118 
1. Era of  Top-Down Racial Assignment 
Whatever latitudinarian construction might otherwise have been given 
to the term ‘white person,’ it is entirely clear that congress intended by this 
legislation to exclude Mongolians from the right of naturalization.119  During 
the Naturalization Era, from 1790 through 1952, civil judges had unfettered 
discretion to decide which immigrants fit within the statutory scope of white-
ness.120  The Naturalization Act of 1790 made whiteness a prerequisite for 
American citizenship during the 160-year period before it was repealed.121  
Immigrants seeking to naturalize were forced to “perform whiteness” before 
civil court judges, and argue that their identities fit within the statutory defi-
nition.122 
In his landmark work, White by Law: The Legal Construction of Race, Ian 
Haney López examines the fifty-two “prerequisite cases” in which immi-
grants appealed administrative decisions finding that they were not white.123  
  
118. Camille Gear Rich, Elective Race: Recognizing Race Discrimination in the Era of Racial Self-
Identification, 102 GEO. L.J. 1501, 1505 (2014) (coining the term “elective race” and 
defining it as “a time when antidiscrimination law is being asked to attend to the dignity 
concerns of individuals as they attempt to control the terms on which their bodies are 
assigned racial meaning”). 
119.  In re Ah Yup, 1 F. Cas. 223, 224 (C.C.D. Cal. 1878). 
120. Naturalization Act of 1790, ch. 3, 1 Stat. 103, repealed by Immigration and Nationality Act 
of 1952, Pub. L. No. 82-414, 66 Stat. 163 (“[A]ny alien, being a free white person, who 
shall have resided within the limits and under the jurisdiction of the United States for the 
term of two years, may be admitted to become a citizen thereof, on application to any 
common law court of record, in any one of the states wherein he shall have resided for the 
term of one year at least . . . .”). 
121. Id.  The Naturalization Act of 1870, which followed the abolition of slavery, extended 
naturalization eligibility to “aliens of African nativity and to persons of African descent.”  
Naturalization Act of 1870, § 7, 16 Stat. 254 (1870). 
122. See John Tehranian, Performing Whiteness: Naturalization Litigation and the Construction of 
Racial Identity in America, 109 YALE L.J. 817, 839–40 (2000) (examining how immigrants 
were tasked with performing whiteness, and persuading judges that they fit within the 
statutory scheme, to be legally naturalized as American citizens).  See generally Khaled A. 
Beydoun, Between Muslim and White: The Legal Construction of Arab American Identity, 69 
N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 29 (2013) (analyzing ten naturalization proceedings involving 
immigrant-petitioners from the Arab World, and how the rulings from these proceedings 
affect the modern legal construction of Arab American identity).  
123. Haney López labels this set of cases as such because whiteness was a prerequisite for 
citizenship.  See Haney López, supra note 89, at 3–9. 
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The first appeal was in 1878,124 and the final case of the Era was decided in 
1944.125  During this Era of Top-Down Racial Assignment, “[t]he courts had 
to establish by law whether, for example, a petitioner’s race was to be meas-
ured by skin color, facial features, national origin, language, culture, ancestry, 
the speculations of scientists, popular opinion, or some combination of these 
factors.”126  Oftentimes, the courts the courts veered away from an assessment 
of the immigrant-petitioner’s whiteness based on these factors, and resorted 
to arbitrary assessments that delivered their desired conclusion.  This was evi-
denced in the two prerequisite cases that reached the Supreme Court in 1922 
and 1923: a Japanese resident of California deemed nonwhite because his an-
cestry and culture were deemed inassimilable,127 and a Sikh man from the In-
dian subcontinent denied naturalization on grounds of “foreign” physical 
appearance.128 
A close examination of the prerequisite cases reveals that the fifty-two 
immigrant petitioners were not only adjudicating their whiteness, but seeking 
to legally pass as white as evidenced by the inquiry undertaken by the courts in 
these cases.  To be sure, the courts were “deciding not only who was White, 
but why someone was White.”129  In adjudicating whiteness for purposes of 
naturalization, courts typically relied on two principles: common knowledge 
and scientific principles.130  In relying on common knowledge, courts incor-
porated common beliefs about race, particularly notions of what the so-called 
average person understood whiteness to mean.131  Courts’ reliance on scientific 
principles revolved around ostensibly “objective, technical, and specialized 
knowledge.”132  By utilizing these two subjective principles—each influenced 
  
124. In re Ah Yup, 1 F. Cas. 223, 224 (C.C.D. Cal. 1878) (No. 104) (denying naturalization to a 
Chinese applicant based on popular understandings of the term “white person,” which the 
court found he did not fit). 
125. Ex parte Mohriez, 54 F. Supp. 941 (D. Mass. 1944) (holding that a Saudi Arabian, Muslim 
man fit within the statutory definition of whiteness).  For a critical analysis of this ruling, 
citing American geopolitical interests influencing the decision, see Beydoun, supra note 122, 
at 68–71. 
126. Haney López, supra note 89, at 2. 
127. Ozawa v. United States, 260 U.S. 178, 189, 198 (1922) (finding that although Takao Ozawa 
resided in the United States for twenty years, attended American churches, and earned his 
college education from the University of California–Berkeley, he was ultimately ineligible for 
naturalization on account of his inassimilable ancestry and culture). 
128. United States v. Thind, 261 U.S. 204, 214–15 (1923) (denying Bhagat Singh Thind 
naturalization because his appearance, religion, and culture did not comport with the judge’s 
conception of whiteness). 
129. Haney López, supra note 89, at 2 (emphasis omitted). 
130. Id. at 5. 
131. Id. at 7. 
132. Id. at 4. 
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by immigration patterns, xenophobia, demographic shifts, the economy, and 
labor concerns—in adjudicating whiteness, courts spurred oft-shifting and 
turbulent conceptions of whiteness during the Naturalization Era.133 
Despite the arbitrary nature and shifting standards of determining 
whiteness, courts adjudicated and granted legal passage into whiteness—and 
the citizenship and concomitant rights and privileges that came with it—until 
1952.  While nonwhites with amenable physical appearances could and did 
informally pass as white during this era,134 a judge stood between them and 
their attainment of legal whiteness.  But the dissolution of the Naturalization 
Act in 1952,135 and the ushering in of the Era of Racial Self-Identification, 
turned that racial regime on its head. 
2. Era of Racial Self-Identification 
[I]f I didn’t define myself for myself, I would be crunched into other 
people’s fantasies for me and eaten alive. 
—Audre Lorde, Sister Outsider136 
The conclusion of the Naturalization Era in 1952 opened the door for 
racial self-identification.  Individual autonomy over racial identity became the 
norm, as individuals rather than courts became able to self-identity their own 
race.137 
  
133. See id. at 76 (examining the different tests judges used to assess immigrant petitioners, and 
most notably, the reliance on eugenics science and the common perception tests).  See 
generally KAREN BRODKIN, HOW JEWS BECAME WHITE FOLKS AND WHAT THAT 
SAYS ABOUT RACE IN AMERICA (1998) (concluding that conceptions of whiteness during 
the Naturalization Era were largely contingent upon developments within the labor sector, 
analyzing how these developments shifted the racialization of Jews from nonwhite to white). 
134. See Haney López, supra note 89, at 48 (describing categories of persons such as Armenians 
and Syrians who were categorized as white by courts and therefore able to become 
naturalized citizens of the United States during the Naturalization Era). 
135. Naturalization Act of 1790, ch. 3, 1 Stat. 103, repealed by Immigration and Nationality Act 
of 1952, Pub. L. No. 82-414, 66 Stat. 163. 
136. AUDRE LORDE, SISTER OUTSIDER: ESSAYS AND SPEECHES 137 (1984). 
137. While the dissolution of the Naturalization Act of 1952 signaled the end of judges 
adjudicating an individual’s race, third-party census-takers continued to be the arbiters of 
individual racial identification until 1960 when individuals were given the opportunity to 
self-identify their own race on the Census.  See Pew Research Ctr., Chapter 1: Race and 
Multiracial Americans in the U.S. Census, PEW SOC. TRENDS (June 11, 2015), 
http://www.pewsocialtrends.org/2015/06/11/chapter-1-race-and-multiracial-americans-in-
the-u-s-census/#fn-20523-11 [https://perma.cc/YY4P-3Z4V] (“From 1790 to 1950, census 
takers determined the race of the Americans they counted, sometimes taking into account 
how individuals were perceived in their community or using rules based on their share of 
‘black blood’. . . . [But] [b]eginning in 1960, Americans could choose their own race.”). 
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Certainly, racial self-determination still had its statutory bounds.  Indi-
vidual modes of racial identification still had to be made within, and in line 
with, state-assigned racial categories.138  Further, racial identification also has 
its cultural bounds.  For individuals who are phenotypically identifiable as 
having dark skin, cultural norms and expectations make it more likely that 
they will self-identify as nonwhite and be identified by others as nonwhite.139  
Nonetheless, selection of racial categories is now such that, with some excep-
tions, individuals can identify as white—or nonwhite—without the need for 
judicial or other third-party endorsement.140  This is what Camille Gear Rich 
calls “elective race,” and is particularly salient for individuals who “occupy the 
margins of [established] racial categories.”141 
As Professor Rich notes, institutional shifts in race-related data collection 
make it substantially easier for individuals to have autonomy in selecting a racial 
classification that suits their desires.142  Indeed, the Office of Management and 
Budget (OMB) and the U.S. Census Bureau, the two principal federal agen-
cies responsible for delineating race and racial categories, both issued direc-
tives that rely on and respect racial self-identification as a means of collecting 
race-related data.143 
  
138. See Michael Omi, Racial Identity and the State: The Dilemmas of Classification, 15 L. & INEQ. 
J. 7, 11–12 (1997) (describing the categories of racial classification utilized on the census 
once individuals were able to self-identify on the census, and critiquing the static nature of 
the categories). 
139. See, e.g., Moni Basu, Black in America: It’s Not Just About the Color of Your Skin, CNN: IN 
AMERICA (Dec. 9, 2012, 8:00 AM), http://inamerica.blogs.cnn.com/2012/12/09/black-
in-america-its-not-just-about-the-color-of-your-skin [https://perma.cc/G7EK-AEH7] 
(chronicling the ways in which people identify themselves as Black and noting that 
“[a]ppearance is a primary factor for many Americans in determining race and identity”). 
140. See generally Rich, supra note 118 (describing the shift to a system of racial classifications 
that allows for self-identification rather than being assigned a racial identity by a court or 
some other third party). 
141. Id. at 1505. 
142. Id. at 1522 (describing changes to federal racial identification schemes that “respected 
individuals’ interest in selecting (or electing) a racial status”). 
143. See, e.g., Office of Mgmt. & Budget, Revisions to the Standards for the Classification of 
Federal Data on Race and Ethnicity, 62 Fed. Reg. 58782, 58782 (Oct. 30, 1997) (“Respect 
for individual dignity should guide the processes and methods for collecting data on race and 
ethnicity; ideally, respondent self-identification should be facilitated to the greatest extent 
possible . . . .”); U.S. Census Bureau, About: Race, CENSUS.GOV (last revised July 8, 2013), 
http://www.census.gov/topics/population/race/about.html [https://perma.cc/QH8GALK9] 
(“The data on race were derived from answers to the question on race that was asked of 
individuals in the United States.”).  The Census Bureau collects racial data in accordance 
with guidelines provided by the U.S. Office of Management and Budget (OMB), and these 
data are based on self-identification.  For a discussion of the OMB’s administrative 
definition, and redefinition, of racial classifications, see Beydoun, supra note 102, at 695–97. 
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By diminishing the courts’ authority over questions of racial identity, 
and enabling individual expressions and configurations that challenged the 
rigidity of prevailing racial classifications and categorization, the Era of Racial 
Self-Identification, or “elective race,” turned the law on its head.  Since indi-
viduals supplanted judges as the arbiters of racial identity, and indeed became 
the arbiters of their own racial identity, they could presumably adopt whatev-
er racial classification (or classifications) they deemed appropriate, even one 
that did not fit with their ancestry, lived experience, or physical appearance.144 
Although the Era of Racial Self-Identification converted questions of 
racial identity from a judicial consideration into an individual matter, it also 
arguably afforded individuals the latitude to think about racial expression and 
identification as a means toward maximizing their interests.  In short, race ar-
guably became as much a question about advancing interests as about express-
ing identity.145  This racial self-identification regime combined with the 
benefits available through affirmative action programming altered the once 
mono-directional incentives of passing from nonwhite to white.146  This par-
allel development of self-identification and affirmative action programming 
spurred racial passing in reverse as a means to acquire the benefits of affirma-
tive action.  
To be precise, the Era of Racial Self-Identification buttressed by pre-
vailing affirmative action jurisprudence did not spawn reverse passing.  As 
examined more fully in this Article, there are many documented incidents of 
reverse passing that precede this juncture.147  But the convergence of the Era 
of Self-Identification with prevailing affirmative action jurisprudence creates 
unprecedented incentives for reverse passing.  The Part that follows advances 
a theory of reverse passing and the ancillary concepts vital for understanding it 
and its application. 
  
144. See Camille Gear Rich, Rachel Dolezal Has a Right to Be Black, CNN (June 16, 2015, 8:06 
AM), http://www.cnn.com/2015/06/15/opinions/rich-rachel-dolezal [https://perma.cc/Z8 
BE-KRXN] (arguing that because race is a social construct Dolezal and all individuals have 
a right to racially identify however they want). 
145. Id. (“[D]ecisions about racial and ethnic identity are typically not merely expressive, 
strategic, or apolitical, but are driven by social conditions.”). 
146. Thompson, supra note 8 (describing the incentives that nonwhites have traditionally had to 
pass for white). 
147. See infra Part III. 
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C. Reverse Passing 
The concept of passing assumes that the passer fails to convert the 
underlying identity, secretly retaining it even as she presents a 
separate face to the outside world. 
—Kenji Yoshino, Covering148 
Reverse passing is the process by which whites disavow their white 
identity and present themselves as nonwhite.149  We label individuals who 
undertake this process as “reverse passers.” 
Although “passing” is common parlance and the subject of extensive 
examination within legal literature and social science,150 this Article is the 
first to define and analyze the proliferating occurrence of reverse passing in 
the United States today.  But like conventional passing, “the outsider not 
only has to perform, but she has to perform well.”151  As defined by Randall 
Kennedy, racial passing is fundamentally a “deception” of the broader public.152  
It is a deception in the sense that an individual intentionally holds him or 
herself out to be a race other than the one that he or she would be assigned 
according to prevailing social norms.  The individual does not reject prevail-
ing social norms or rules regarding racial identification; rather they engage in 
acts of deception in order to adhere to prevailing social standards related to 
  
148. Yoshino, supra note 4, at 813. 
149. To be clear, nonwhites are also capable of reverse passing as another racial minority.  See, 
e.g., Vijay Chokal-Ingam, Why I Faked Being Black for Med School, N.Y. POST (Apr. 12, 
2015, 5:05 AM), http://nypost.com/2015/04/12/mindy-kalings-brother-explains-why-he-
pretended-to-be-black [https://perma.cc/MMS9-SZZW] (describing the experience of a 
Southeast Asian medical school applicant who represented himself as Black in order to 
obtain admission to medical school through a race-conscious affirmative action program).  
Indeed, “racially ambiguous groups such as South Asian Americans, can simultaneously 
possess attributes of whiteness, ‘foreignness,’ and ‘blackness,’ and may attempt to claim or 
rebuke these attributes.”  Vinay Harpalani, DesiCrit: Theorizing the Racial Ambiguity of South 
Asian Americans, 69 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 77, 183 (2013).  Yet the specific focus of 
this Article is on reverse passing from white to any nonwhite racial identity. 
150. See generally Nix & Qian, supra note 51, for a statistical analysis of the rate at which Black 
men and women passed for white during the Reconstruction and Jim Crow Eras through 
1940, in addition to statistical evidence of reverse passing.  The time period covered by Nix 
and Qian overlaps with what social psychologists called “the great age of passing,” which 
“occurred between 1880 and 1925.”  Khanna & Johnson, supra note 3, at 382.  One estimate 
held that “approximately 10,000 to 20,000 people with black ancestry disappeared into the 
white population each year from 1900 to 1920.  Other scholars have put the figure 
significantly higher at over 100,000 people annually.”  Id. (citations omitted).  For a 
historical genealogy of the term “passing” in American history, see generally Ginsberg, supra 
note 28. 
151. Carbado & Gulati, supra note 17, at 1291. 
152. Kennedy, supra note 5, at 1145. 
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the race into which they are passing.153  In order for this deception to be suc-
cessful, the passer must consistently and convincingly perform the identity into 
which she is passing.154 
Defined broadly to illustrate the conceptual and operational framework 
of the term, reverse passing is enabled and facilitated by the prevailing Era of 
Racial Self-Identification.  The ability to elect which race one belongs to on 
the U.S. Census form, employment, and college applications affords great lat-
itude to individuals over matters of racial identity and affiliation.155  This 
formal declaration of racial identity reveals a critical ancillary definition, 
“legal reverse passing.” 
Legal reverse passing is the process by which whites disavow their white 
identity and present themselves as per se nonwhite on legal and administra-
tive documents.  These documents may include: birth certificates, the Census 
form, college and graduate school applications, employment applications and 
statistics, demographic data, and more.  Legal reverse passers may or may not 
seek to present themselves as nonwhite beyond the four corners of legal or 
administrative documents—for example, in cultural spheres. 
Cultural reverse passing is the process by which whites disavow their 
white identity and present themselves as nonwhite in cultural spaces.  Here, 
we define “cultural” broadly to include spaces in the real world, and examine 
cultural reverse passing within the political and social spheres.  Cultural re-
verse passers may or may not seek to legally reverse pass, creating the possibil-
ity of racial fissure (and conflict) with their cultural presentation and legal 
identification. 
Below, we illustrate and analyze how legal and cultural reverse passing 
unfolds through case law and case studies.  A preliminary step for engaging 
that discussion, however, is an analysis of how prevailing equal protection ju-
risprudence has enabled, and in many instances incentivized, reverse passing 
in both the legal, cultural, and combined sense. 
  
153. See, e.g., id. at 1150–51 (describing an instance in which an individual was passing from 
Black to white and noting that “[w]hen pressed to talk on the telephone with some authority 
on an important matter—a consumer complaint, dealing with police, seeking employment 
or educational opportunities—she would adopt an accent that most listeners would associate 
with the speech of a white person”). 
154. See id. at 1165–66 (chronicling the attempts of a woman passing from Black to white to 
maintain her new identity without getting caught). 
155.  While the Era of Racial Self-Identification heralded many positive changes for nonwhites—
particularly the autonomy of being able to chose one’s own racial identity—racial identity 
brought with it the concerning consequences of reverse passing. 
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II. REVERSE PASSING AND THE LAW 
The Era of Self-Identification allows persons to racially identify as they 
see fit.  To be sure, the privileges and benefits afforded to whiteness have not 
diminished, and those who can self-identify as white still have plenty of in-
centive to do so.  Yet the Supreme Court’s affirmative action jurisprudence, 
particularly the articulation of diversity as the lone compelling state interest 
that justifies race-conscious affirmative action programming, creates an in-
centive for reverse passers to want to self-identify as nonwhite. 
As other scholars such as Nancy Leong have noted, the Supreme Court’s 
focus on racial diversity as a compelling state interest has created a situational 
value in nonwhiteness that did not previously exist.156  Whereas in the past 
the incentives for passing were solely for nonwhites to pass as whites, the in-
creased interest in cultivating nonwhiteness provides incentives for whites to 
pass as nonwhite. 
This Part provides a detailed analysis of how the Supreme Court’s af-
firmative action jurisprudence created situational value in nonwhiteness 
through its articulation of diversity as a compelling state interest.  It then ana-
lyzes how the situational value in nonwhiteness converges with the Era of 
Self-Identification to create a fertile landscape for reverse passers to frame 
their identities in ways that facilitate access to coveted legal and cultural inter-
ests. 
A. Affirmative Action, Equal Protection, and the Remedial Justification 
You do not take a person who . . . has been hobbled by chains and 
liberate him, bring him up to the starting line of a race and then 
say, ‘you are free to compete with all the others,’ and still justly be-
lieve that you have been completely fair. 
—Lyndon B. Johnson157 
Broadly defined, affirmative action programs attempt to increase opportu-
nities for members of minority groups to participate in core sectors of society 
  
156. See Leong, supra note 33, at 2169 (“Efforts to create racial diversity usually begin—and often 
end—with increasing the number of nonwhite people within a group or institution.  As a 
result, nonwhiteness has acquired a unique value because, in many contexts, it signals the 
presence of the prized characteristic of diversity.”). 
157. Lyndon B. Johnson, Commencement Address at Howard University: “To Fulfill These Rights” 
(June 4, 1965), in PUBLIC PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS OF THE UNITED STATES 636 
(1965). 
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from which they have been historically excluded and in which they are contem-
porarily underrepresented.158  Since its inception, race-based affirmative action 
programming has been gradually eroded and steered by the courts to advance 
a narrower mission: racial diversity. 
The first affirmative action program was established by Executive Order 
11246 (Order).159  The Order not only prohibited government contractors 
from discriminating against minorities, but also required them to take affirm-
ative measures to ensure that minorities who were excluded from public sector 
employment in the past were now included.160  Order 11246 resulted in a 
comprehensive statutory scheme that required anyone wishing to contract 
with the federal government to take steps to ensure minority inclusion.  For 
example, it required contractors to review their employment practices and ex-
amine whether they presented obstacles to hiring minorities.161  If their prac-
tices did create such obstacles, the Order required contractors to develop a 
plan to eliminate them.162  It also mandated that contractors engage in re-
cruiting efforts to attract minority candidates and diversify the pool of candi-
dates from which it was selecting.163 
Importantly, the Order reflected the understanding that, to create equal 
opportunities for minorities, non-discrimination policies were not enough.  
  
158. See generally 41 C.F.R. § 60-2.10 (1984) (describing the purpose and content of federal 
contractor affirmative action programs). 
159. See Exec, Order No. 11246, 30 Fed. Reg. 12315, 12320 (Sept. 28, 1965) (“[C]ontractor will 
not discriminate against any employee or applicant for employment because of race, creed, 
color, or national origin. . . . [and] will take affirmative action to ensure that applicants 
are employed, and that employees are treated during employment, without regard to their 
race, creed, color, or national origin.”).  Prior to the enactment of Executive Order 11246, race-
conscious legislation was enacted during the Reconstruction Era that required affirmative steps to 
be taken to remedy historic discrimination and subordination against Blacks, but that legislation 
was ultimately deemed unconstitutional.  See, e.g., Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883).  
President Kennedy also enacted Executive Order 10925, which required contractors to “take 
affirmative action to ensure that applicants are employed” in the form of recruiting 
minorities for jobs.  Exec. Order No. 10925, 26 Fed. Reg. 1977 (Mar. 6, 1961).  However, 
Executive Order 11246 was the first program to take aggressive measures beyond just 
recruiting.  Thus, Executive Order 11246 is widely considered to be the first modern-day 
affirmative action program. 
160. Exec. Order No. 11246, 30 Fed. Reg. 12315, 12320 (Sept. 28, 1965). 
161. 41 C.F.R. § 60-2.17 (b) (“The contractor must perform in-depth analyses of its total 
employment process to determine whether and where impediments to equal employment 
opportunity exist.”). 
162. 41 C.F.R. § 60-2.17 (c) (“The contractor must develop and execute action-oriented 
programs designed to correct any problem areas identified pursuant to § 60-2.17(b) and to 
attain established goals and objectives.”). 
163. 41 C.F.R. § 60-50.2 (“[E]mployers shall undertake appropriate outreach and positive 
recruitment activities . . . .”). 
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Rather, affirmative steps were needed to robustly address the historic patterns 
of intentional exclusion and marginalization of nonwhites from all sectors of 
society.164  The Order embodied an anti-subordination approach towards 
equality insofar as it sought to achieve “not just equality as a right and a theory 
but equality as a fact and equality as a result.”165 
Thus, the original rationale for affirmative action eschewed the tradi-
tional individualistic nature of legal remedies and the thread of individualism 
that generally runs through American public discourse.  Instead, it recog-
nized that individuals were discriminated against because of their member-
ship in a particular group and, as a result, remedies targeted toward particular 
groups rather than individual remedies were appropriate.166  This rationale 
was the genesis of the remedial justification for affirmative action.167 
Initially, federal courts were clear that the broad nature of the remedial 
justification did not run afoul of the Constitution on Fourteenth Amendment 
equal protection grounds.  For example, one of the first challenges to the le-
gality of Executive Order 11246 was made by a contractors’ association that 
challenged an affirmative action plan on the grounds that it required the con-
tractors’ association to discriminate against whites, and “unreasonably re-
quire[d] contractors to undertake to remedy an evil for which . . . they [were 
not] responsible.”168  The Third Circuit rejected this contention, emphasizing 
that the affirmative action plan was “valid Executive action designed to reme-
dy the perceived evil that minority tradesmen [were not] included in the labor 
pool . . . [and] a finding as to the historical reason for the exclusion of availa-
ble tradesmen from the labor pool [was] not essential for federal contractual 
remedial action.”169  Other federal courts examining the constitutionality of 
  
164. See generally Bok & Bowen, supra note 48, at 1–15 (describing the history of exclusion of racial 
and ethnic minorities from important American institutions that spurred the affirmative action 
legislation). 
165. Johnson, supra note 157, at 636. 
166. See Carl E. Brody, Jr., A Historical Review of Affirmative Action and the Interpretation of Its 
Legislative Intent by the Supreme Court, 29 AKRON L. REV. 291, 301 (1996) (analyzing the 
origins of affirmative action programs and finding that the government enacted such 
programs in response to centuries of discrimination against African-Americans and a desire 
to enact laws that both prohibited discrimination and provided remedial relief for past 
discrimination). 
167. See id. 
168. Contractors Ass'n of E. Pa. v. Sec'y of Labor, 442 F.2d 159, 165, 176 (3d Cir. 1971), cert. 
denied, 404 U.S. 854 (1971). 
169. Id. at 177. 
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the broad remedial justification for affirmative action plans came to similar 
conclusions.170 
Thus, the broad remedial justification for affirmative action programs 
initially stood on firm legal footing.  Courts recognized that, as a matter of 
general policy, programs implemented by the executive and legislative branch-
es to remedy past discrimination against minority groups—particularly Afri-
can-Americans—that affirmatively targeted such groups for inclusion did not 
violate the Equal Protection Clause. 
Ultimately, however, as minorities began to gain entrance into sectors of 
the employment market and elite educational institutions from which they 
were traditionally excluded, the narrative regarding the remedial justification 
for affirmative action began to change, both in the general public discourse 
and in the courts.171  The group nature of the remedy was vociferously ques-
tioned, critiqued by proponents of pure meritocracy and colorblindness,172 
and a new narrative emerged that race-conscious affirmative action programs 
constituted “reverse discrimination” against whites in violation of the Four-
teenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause.173  Blacks and other nonwhites 
  
170. See, e.g., Legal Aid Soc’y of Alameda Cty. v. Brennan, 608 F.2d 1319, 1343 (9th Cir. 1979) 
(“Nothing in the decree or inherent in the circumstances of this case requires preferential 
treatment or discrimination on the basis of race or sex.  We therefore need not consider 
when if ever racial and sexual preferences and discrimination undertaken to comply with 
Executive Order 11246 can be lawful under either Title VII or the Constitution.”); 
Associated Gen. Contractors of Mass., Inc. v. Altshuler, 490 F.2d 9, 16 (1st Cir. 1973) 
(finding that an affirmative action program did not violate the Constitution’s equal 
protection requirements and reasoning in part that “our society cannot be completely 
colorblind in the short term if we are to have a colorblind society in the long 
term. . . . Discrimination has a way of perpetuating itself, albeit unintentionally, because the 
resulting inequalities make new opportunities less accessible.  Preferential treatment is one 
partial prescription to remedy our society’s most intransigent and deeply rooted 
inequalities.”); Northeast Constr. Co. v. Romney, 485 F.2d 752 (D.C. Cir. 1973). 
171. See generally John Cocchi Day, Retelling the Story of Affirmative Action: Reflections on a Decade 
of Federal Jurisprudence in the Public Workplace, 89 CAL. L. REV. 59 (2001) (describing the 
decline in the judiciary’s willingness to accept race-conscious affirmative action programs as 
constitutional); Kent Greenawalt, The Unresolved Problems of Reverse Discrimination, 67 
CAL. L. REV. 87 (1979) (critiquing the use of race-conscious affirmative action programs 
and the Supreme Court’s use of the diversity rationale to support such programs); James E. 
Jones, Jr., “Reverse Discrimination” in Employment: Judicial Treatment of Affirmative Action 
Programs in the United States, 25 HOW. L.J. 217 (1982) (describing the emergence of reverse 
discrimination claims by whites claiming that they were harmed by race-conscious affirmative 
action programs that benefited racial minorities). 
172. See generally Keith Aoki, The Scholarship of Reconstruction and the Politics of Backlash, 81 
IOWA L. REV. 1467 (1996) (describing the backlash against affirmative action and the 
arguments regarding meritocracy and colorblindness advanced in support thereof). 
173. See generally Day, supra note 171; Jones, Jr., supra note 171. 
Reverse Passing 315 
 
 
were widely perceived as benefitting at the expense of whites,174 which in turn 
spawned complaints of reverse racism and the erosion of meritocracy.175 
As discussed in the following Part, this backlash against minority inclu-
sion and the perception that Blacks and other minorities were gaining at the 
expense of whites resulted in a very narrow construction of the circumstances 
in which remedying past discrimination could be used to justify affirmative 
action programs, and a marked shift away from the original remediation justi-
fication for affirmative action.  In place of the remedial justification sprung a 
rationalization completely divorced from the lived history of exclusion and 
marginalization faced by minorities: the diversity justification. 
B. Affirmative Action, Equal Protection, and Racial Diversity 
A little over a decade after President Johnson enacted Executive Order 
11246, affirmative action programs proliferated.176  Opinions about the pro-
grams varied widely, with many questioning both the legality and the equity 
of the programs.177  There were a number of legal challenges to the constitu-
tionality of the programs in lower courts, but for several years after the en-
actment of Executive Order 11246, the Supreme Court managed to evade 
answering pressing questions as to the legality of such programs.178 
It was not until Regents of the University of California v. Bakke in 1978 
that the Court finally weighed in on the constitutionality of affirmative ac-
tion programs.179  The Court’s opinion in Bakke was critical because it laid 
the groundwork for both the legal and normative justification for affirmative 
  
174. See, e.g., Greenawalt, supra note 171, at 87 (“[W]hen individual blacks and members of other 
minority groups began to be given benefits at the expense of whites who, apart from race, 
would have had a superior claim to enjoy them, the values [underlying affirmative action] 
were brought into sharp conflict, dividing previously allied liberal organizations . . . .”). 
175. See id. (summarizing the opposition to affirmative action as stemming from “individual 
blacks and members of other minority groups [being] given benefits at the expense of whites 
who, apart from race, would have had a superior claim to enjoy them . . .”). 
176. See Jones, Jr., supra note 171, at 230 (noting the “proliferation of affirmative action requirements”). 
177. See generally Martin H. Redish, Preferential Law School Admissions and the Equal Protection 
Clause: An Analysis of the Competing Arguments, 22 UCLA L. REV. 343 (1974) (analyzing the 
various arguments for and against the constitutionality of affirmative action programs). 
178. Indeed, the Supreme Court denied certiorari in many cases challenging the constitutionality 
of affirmative action programs.  See supra notes 168–170 and accompanying text.  When the 
Court finally granted certiorari in DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312 (1974), the Court 
punted on questions regarding the constitutionality of the University of Washington Law 
School’s affirmative action program and instead found that the issue was moot because the 
individual challenging the program had reached his third year of law school at the University 
of Washington by the time the Court took up the case. 
179. 438 U.S. 265 (1978). 
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action as we know it today.  More importantly, it also changed the terms up-
on which minority inclusion would be conceptualized in education, employ-
ment, and American society more broadly.  As affirmative action continues to 
be whittled down by the federal judiciary today, and perhaps even more so 
with the Supreme Court’s reassessment in Fisher II during the 2016 term, the 
lone legal legs it has to stand on is the racial diversity rationale. 
1. Bakke and the Diversity Rationale 
In Bakke, a white male applicant to the University of California at Davis 
Medical School challenged the constitutionality of the medical school’s spe-
cial admissions program, which set aside sixteen out of a total of one hundred 
slots for disadvantaged minority students.180  The plaintiff, Alan Bakke, al-
leged that the University unlawfully discriminated against him because of his 
race in violation of, among other things, the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal 
Protection Clause.181  Bakke’s legal claim fomented the idea of reverse dis-
crimination as it is known today, and in turn, challenged the formative reme-
dial mission of affirmative action programming.182 
Importantly, prior to the Court’s decision in Bakke, there was much de-
bate as to what standard of review should be applied to programs that use ex-
press racial classifications to favor minorities who were previously discriminated 
against.183  A plurality decision authored by Justice Powell answered this ques-
tion by finding that “equal protection cannot mean one thing when applied to 
one individual and something else when applied to a person of another color” 
and that racial and ethnic classifications always call for the “most exacting 
  
180. Id. at 279–80. 
181. Id. 
182. Id.; see Alan Freeman, Antidiscrimination Law: The View From 1989, 64 TUL. L. REV. 1407, 
1431–33 (1990) (describing how the Supreme Court’s affirmative action jurisprudence 
accepted and crystallized claims of reverse discrimination by white plaintiffs). 
183. See Redish, supra note 177, at 345. 
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judicial examination.”184  To that end, Justice Powell went on to apply strict 
scrutiny to the U.C. Davis Medical School admissions program.185 
Powell then examined the program’s stated purposes, including “coun-
tering the effects of societal discrimination” and “achieving a diverse student 
body.”186  He determined that “countering the effects of societal discrimina-
tion” was not an appropriately compelling state interest in this instance because 
there had been no finding of identifiable discrimination against disadvantaged 
groups within the context of admissions to the University of California at Davis 
medical school by the judiciary, legislature, or an administrative agency.187  
Powell’s narrow construction of past discrimination in Bakke was pivotal, 
holding that macro evidence of past discrimination was not enough.188  Af-
firmative action programs and their administrators, including the U.C. Davis 
Medical School, would instead have to produce targeted evidence, illustrating 
that the institution itself discriminated against the protected (nonwhite) 
groups.189  Absent the production of evidence of specific institutional discrim-
ination, Powell reasoned that white applicants would be unfairly made to bear 
the burden of “whatever harm the beneficiaries of the special admissions pro-
gram [were] thought to have suffered.”190 
Powell, however, found that the Medical School’s stated goal of achiev-
ing a diverse student body was indeed a compelling state interest that justified 
  
184. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 289–91.  In contrast, in their concurring opinion, Justices Marshall, 
White, Brennan, and Blackmun advocated a less exacting standard that would have required 
the Court to inquire as to whether racial classifications designed to further the goal of 
remedying past discrimination “serve important governmental objectives” that are 
“substantially related to achievement of those objectives.”  Id. at 359 (Brennan, J., 
concurring) (citations omitted).  In advocating adoption of this intermediate approach to 
analyzing affirmative action programs, the concurring justices reasoned that a standard less 
exacting than strict scrutiny was appropriate because the race-conscious programs are 
designed not to stigmatize minorities but rather to help them.  Id. at 359–60. 
185. Id. at 291 (majority opinion) (finding that “[r]acial and ethnic distinctions of any sort are 
inherently suspect and thus call for the most exacting judicial examination”). 
186. Id. at 306, 267. 
187. Id. at 306–10. 
188. Id. at 310 (“[T]he purpose of helping certain groups whom the faculty of the Davis Medical 
School perceived as victims of ‘societal discrimination’ does not justify a classification that 
imposes disadvantages upon persons like respondent, who bear no responsibility for 
whatever harm the beneficiaries of the special admissions program are thought to have 
suffered.”). 
189. Id. at 307–09 (emphasizing that the Court had never accepted the idea that the goal of 
remedying societal discrimination was a compelling state interest in the absence of a specific 
finding or adjudication of discrimination, and noting that the University could not make 
such a finding because “[i]ts broad mission is education, not the formulation of any 
legislative policy or the adjudication of particular claims of illegality”). 
190. Id. at 310. 
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application of race-conscious affirmative action admissions decisions.191  In 
reaching this conclusion, Powell couched the interest in terms of academic 
freedom, emphasizing that the “freedom of a university to make its own 
judgments as to education includes the selection of its student body.”192  
Though the Court ultimately found that the Medical School’s program was 
not narrowly tailored to achieve this goal,193 the decision for the first time in-
troduced the diversity justification for race-conscious affirmative action pro-
grams both into the legal sphere and the public discourse more generally. 
By upholding diversity—rather than remediation of past discrimina-
tion—as the compelling state interest that would justify the use of race-
conscious affirmative action programs, the Court ushered in a new legal and 
normative conceptualization of the significance of race generally and diversity 
in particular.  In his plurality opinion, Justice Powell emphasized the per-
ceived benefits that accrue to students and society as a whole when students 
have the ability to interact and learn from students who are different from 
them.194  The articulation of diversity as a compelling state interest for these 
reasons completely erased discrimination from the calculus.  It focused on the 
ability of students to learn from one another’s differences, rather than the his-
tory of discrimination and oppression that resulted in the exclusion of minority 
students from elite educational opportunities.  As other scholars have noted, 
this rationale does not account for the lived experiences of minority students, 
particularly discriminatory experiences that may have shaped both the stu-
dents’ identities and the opportunities available to them.195 
Indeed, the U.C. Davis Medical School admissions program that the 
Court struck down as unconstitutional took both the racial identities of the ap-
plicants and their lived experiences into consideration.196  In contrast, the diver-
sity rationale championed by Powell was premised on the perceived ability of 
  
191. Id. at 311–12. 
192. Id. at 312. 
193. Id. at 319–20. 
194. Id. at 314 (“Physicians serve a heterogeneous population.  An otherwise qualified medical 
student with a particular background—whether it be ethnic, geographic, culturally 
advantaged or disadvantaged—may bring to a professional school of medicine experiences, 
outlooks, and ideas that enrich the training of its student body and better equip its graduates 
to render with understanding their vital service to humanity.”). 
195. See Redish, supra note 177, at 396. 
196. Greenawalt, supra note 171, at 88–89 (noting that applicants for U.C. Davis’s special 
admissions program “had to be both a member of one of four ‘minority groups’—blacks, 
Chicanos, Asians, and American Indians—and either educationally or economically 
disadvantaged. . . . [and therefore] neither a very poor white nor a wealthy black educated at 
expensive private schools was eligible for the special program”). 
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nonwhite students to ostensibly provide a perspective in the classroom unfa-
miliar to white students.  While it speaks volumes about the educational and 
experiential value nonwhite students extend to white students, the diversity 
rationale championed by Powell is silent about the inherent value of these 
nonwhite students’ lived experiences.  And more importantly, Powell’s ra-
tionale was dismissive of the past and contemporary inequities that stifled 
their access to educational institutions like the U.C. Davis Medical School.  
Furthermore, Powell did not seek to dismantle the racial hierarchy inherent in 
traditionally white spaces, such as elite medical schools, that spurred the need 
for race-conscious affirmative action programs in the first place.  Instead, his 
viewpoint reified those structures by suggesting that race-conscious programs 
are only legitimate insofar as they increase the number of nonwhite students in 
traditionally white spaces who can in turn serve an educational purpose for 
white students. 
As a result, the diversity rationale favors performance of racial identity—
meaning the ability to perform in ways that deviate from white cultural 
norms—over actual lived experiences and historical racial discrimination.  
Despite these deficiencies, the diversity rationale has been bolstered by sub-
sequent Supreme Court decisions, most notably Grutter and Fisher, and, 
consequently, has essentially supplanted the remedial justification for race-
conscious affirmative action programs.197 
2. Beyond Bakke: Diversity Supplants Remedial Affirmative Action 
As discussed in Part II.B.1, in the early affirmative action cases, lower 
courts shied away from narrowly construing the remedial justification for af-
firmative action.  Instead, these courts deferred to the legislative branches’ 
determination that race-conscious affirmative action programs were neces-
sary to remedy past discrimination.198  That began to change with the Su-
preme Court’s decision in Bakke.  This Part examines how the unraveling of 
  
197. See Charles R. Lawrence III, Each Other’s Harvest: Diversity’s Deeper Meaning, 31 U.S.F. L. 
REV. 757, 764 (1997) (assessing the continued legal vitality of race-conscious affirmative 
action programs and noting that the Supreme Court decisions that struck down the remedial 
justification for affirmative action “have not overruled Bakke, and that Powell’s diversity 
reasoning is uniquely applicable to the educational setting where the pedagogic purposes of 
affirmative action, flexible processes of admissions, and faculty hiring distinguish it from the 
contract set-aside cases” that were struck down as unconstitutional uses of the remedial 
justification for affirmative action). 
198. See supra notes 170–172 and accompanying text. 
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the remedial justification started in Bakke continued with subsequent Su-
preme Court jurisprudence. 
In Bakke, the Justices took different stances on how broadly the reme-
dial justification for race-conscious affirmative action programs was to be 
construed.  Justice Powell insisted that a prior judicial or legislative deter-
mination of discrimination was necessary in order for a remedial race-
conscious affirmative action program to be appropriate.199  Justices Brennan, 
White, Marshall and Blackmun, on the other hand, took the position that a 
“judicial determination of a constitutional or statutory violation as a predicate 
for race-conscious remedial actions would be self-defeating” because it would 
undermine voluntary efforts to remedy the effects of past discrimination.200 
Following Bakke, some lower federal courts and the Supreme Court con-
tinued to broadly construe the remedial purpose justification and to defer to 
the legislature’s determination that race-conscious affirmative action pro-
grams were necessary.  For example, in Local Union No. 35 of International 
Brotherhood of Electrical Workers v. City of Hartford, the Second Circuit upheld 
the constitutionality of an affirmative action ordinance adopted by the City of 
Hartford, Connecticut.201  The ordinance required contractors to use a good 
faith effort to employ a workforce that was fifteen percent women or minori-
ties on all city construction contracts greater than ten thousand dollars.202  In 
upholding the constitutionality of the ordinance, the Second Circuit reasoned 
that the Hartford City Council was a competent body to make a legislative 
determination regarding past discrimination and that their findings of past 
and present discrimination were sufficient to justify upholding the affirmative 
action ordinance.203 
Similarly, in Fullilove v. Klutznick, the Supreme Court upheld as consti-
tutional a minority set-aside affirmative action program, reasoning that Con-
gress’s broad remedial purpose in enacting the set-aside program was to halt 
the “perpetuation of the effects of prior discrimination which had impaired or 
foreclosed access by minority businesses to public contracting opportunities” 
and that such a broad remedial purpose was appropriate.204  However, after 
Fullilove, the Court narrowed the construction of the remedial purpose justi-
fication such that it was available in theory but not in reality. 
  
199. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 301–02. 
200. Id. at 364 (Brennan, J., concurring). 
201. 625 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1980). 
202. Id. at 418–20. 
203. Id. at 421–22. 
204. 448 U.S. 448, 473 (1980). 
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In Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education, the Court rejected a broad re-
medial purpose justification for a race-conscious provision in a teacher’s col-
lective bargaining agreement that gave minority teachers greater protections 
from layoffs.205  In particular, the Court rejected the school board’s contention 
that the program was necessary to provide role models for minority students 
to counter the effects of societal discrimination.206  Instead, the Court for the 
first time linked the remedial justification for affirmative action programs to a 
specific evidentiary standard and required that there be “convincing evidence 
that [a] remedial action is warranted” before a remedial purpose for an affirm-
ative action program would be sustained.207 
The imposition of such a standard represented a clear narrowing of the 
instances in which a remedial purpose could be used to justify affirmative ac-
tion programs, particularly given the realities of how discrimination works.208  
Importantly, Justice O’Connor’s concurring opinion clearly emphasizes that 
other compelling state interests—such as diversity—could still be used to 
support affirmative action programs.209  The diversity rationale would effec-
tively become the most viable option available for upholding affirmative ac-
tion programs after the Supreme Court’s decisions in City of Richmond v. J. A. 
Croson Co.210 and Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena.211 
In Croson, the Court arguably sounded the death knell of the remedial 
justification for race-conscious affirmative action programs.  The Court reaf-
firmed the evidentiary standard set forth in Wygant, which required convinc-
ing evidence, namely that there was “a strong basis in evidence” that a remedial 
affirmative action program is warranted before a race-conscious remedial af-
firmative action program can be lawfully implemented.212  In addition, the 
  
205. 476 U.S. 267 (1986). 
206. Id. at 274–76. 
207. Id. at 277. 
208. Indeed, modern-day discrimination is often not explicit and is instead a function of deeply 
embedded cognitive biases that systematically work to oppress and exclude racial and ethnic 
minorities.  See, e.g., Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: 
Reckoning With Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317, 323 (1987) (arguing that the 
current legal requirements for demonstrating actionable discrimination “ignores much of 
what we understand about how the human mind works . . . [i]t also disregards both the 
irrationality of racism and the profound effect that the history of American race relations has 
had on the individual and collective unconscious”).  As a result the kind of “convincing 
evidence” needed to sustain a remedial justification for an affirmative action program in the 
wake of Wygant is difficult to obtain. 
209. Id. at 286 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
210. 488 U.S. 469 (1989). 
211. 515 U.S. 200 (1995). 
212. Croson, 488 U.S. at 510 (citation omitted). 
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Court found that strict scrutiny should be applied to when a classification is 
made on the basis of race.213  However, in Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, the 
Supreme Court backtracked and applied intermediate scrutiny to a race-
conscious affirmative action program.214  Five years later, the Court in 
Adarand overruled Metro Broadcasting, definitively finding that race-
conscious programs should be subject to strict scrutiny review.215 
The Court in Adarand noted that the application of strict scrutiny to 
race-conscious affirmative action programs did not mean that the standard of 
review would be “strict in theory, but fatal in fact.”216  Yet insofar as the reme-
dial justifications for race-conscious affirmative action programs are con-
cerned, that was indeed the result.217 
The import of Wygant, Croson, and Adarand was to narrow the scope of 
affirmative action programs that would be deemed constitutional under a re-
medial justification purpose for affirmative action.218  These decisions did so 
by imposing a high evidentiary burden on entities wishing to enact race-
conscious affirmative action programs for purposes of remedying discrimi-
nation.  Because of the legal obstacles associated with articulating and 
maintaining a race-conscious affirmative action program for purposes of 
remedying past discrimination, those seeking to utilize a race-conscious af-
firmative action program are more likely to prevail in court if they instead choose 
to articulate a desire to achieve diversity as the rationale for such a program.219  
  
213. Id. at 494. 
214. Metro Broad., Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 567–68 (1990), overruled by Adarand 
Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995) (applying intermediate scrutiny to an 
affirmative action program and finding that “the interest in enhancing broadcast diversity is, 
at the very least, an important governmental objective and is therefore a sufficient basis for 
the Commission’s minority ownership policies”). 
215. Adarand, 515 U.S. at 237. 
216. Id. (quoting Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 519 (1980) (Marshall, J., concurring)). 
217. See Carl L. Livingston, Jr., Affirmative Action on Trial: The Retraction of Affirmative Action 
and the Case for Its Retention, 40 HOW. L.J. 145, 156 (1996) (arguing that after Bakke, the 
Court attacked remedial affirmative action programs by “limiting the scope of [their] use, 
heightening the standard of review, and imposing an increasing burden of production”); see 
also Brent E. Simmons, Reconsidering Strict Scrutiny of Affirmative Action, 2 MICH. J. RACE 
& L. 51, 88–90 (1996) (critiquing the Supreme Court’s adoption of strict scrutiny for remedial 
affirmative action programs and demonstrating how the use of strict scrutiny has allowed lower 
federal courts to strike down legitimate race-conscious affirmative action programs). 
218. See Kathleen M. Sullivan, City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co.: The Backlash Against 
Affirmative Action, 64 TUL. L. REV. 1609, 1612 (1990) (“Croson culminated the Court’s 
long-mounting trend toward limiting the justification for affirmative action to a narrow 
brand of corrective justice: remedying particularized past discrimination.”). 
219. See Lawrence III, supra note 197, at 764 (“[A]ffirmative action’s supporters have looked to 
Powell’s Bakke decision for the salvation of affirmative action in higher education.”). 
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The proliferation of the diversity rationale as the primary justification used to 
support affirmative action programs is discussed in the Part that follows. 
3. The Diversity Rationale Goes Mainstream 
After the Court’s decisions in cases including Wygant, Croson, and 
Adarand substantially tightened the requirements for showing a proper re-
medial justification for race-conscious affirmative action programs, the only 
realistic and viable way to sustain any affirmative action program was under a 
diversity rationale, such as the one put forth in Bakke.220  Subsequently, in 
higher education cases challenging the propriety of race-conscious affirmative 
action programs, particularly the validity of the diversity rationale, the Court 
doubled down on the diversity rationale and the reasoning set forth in Bakke. 
For example, in Grutter v. Bollinger, the Court upheld diversity as a compel-
ling state interest that justifies the use of race-conscious admissions programs, rea-
soning that “student body diversity promotes learning outcomes, and better 
prepares students for an increasingly diverse workforce and society, and better pre-
pares them as professionals.”221  Similar to the reasoning in Bakke, the Court in 
Grutter found that diversity was a compelling state interest, largely deferring 
to the Michigan Law School’s judgment—grounded in its understanding of 
academic freedom—of the institutional value of racial diversity.222  In Fisher 
v. University of Texas at Austin, the Court reaffirmed that diversity can serve 
as a compelling state interest that justifies race-conscious admissions poli-
cies, so long as diversity is not defined as racial balancing and race is one 
among many factors considered in the admissions program.223 
Importantly, the Court in both Grutter and Fisher received amicus briefs 
from all sectors of society including the U.S. military and Fortune 500 compa-
nies.224  The Court in both cases cited and relied on the arguments advanced in 
those briefs in extolling the virtues of diversity when analyzing whether diversity 
was indeed a compelling state interest.225  The Court however failed to include 
  
220. See generally Akhil Reed Amar & Neal Kumar Katyal, Bakke’s Fate, 43 UCLA L. REV. 
1745, 1775–76 (1996) (arguing that the diversity rationale articulated by Justice Powell in 
Bakke can and should be used to implement race-conscious affirmative action programs). 
221. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 330 (2003) (citations omitted). 
222. Id. at 328 (“The Law School’s educational judgment that such diversity is essential to its 
educational mission is one to which we defer.”). 
223. 133 S. Ct. 2411, 2417–18 (2013). 
224. Brief for Amici Curiae of 65 Leading American Businesses in Support of Respondents, 
Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (Nos. 02-241, 02-516). 
225. See, e.g., Grutter, 539 U.S. at 330–31 (describing the benefits associated with diversity and 
noting that the “high-ranking retired officers and civilian leaders of the United 
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any consideration or analysis of the lived experience of students, particularly the 
historical discrimination against individuals because of their membership in par-
ticular racial or ethnic groups in reifying diversity as a compelling state interest.  
As Rachel Moran notes, “[s]tripped of the compelling imagery of corrective 
justice, the Michigan cases [Grutter and Gratz] leave affirmative action in the 
uneasy space between constitutional law and constitutional culture.”226  That 
is to say, the Court seemed to rely on non-judicial actors’ understanding of 
the Constitution in its own interpretation of the Constitution—in this case 
those of the Fortune 500 and military amici227—without sufficiently weighing 
the obligation of the law to remedy rights violations.228 
Consequently, the kinds of diversity that institutions can pursue through 
race-conscious admissions programs are not defined by any concrete notion 
of the need for corrective or restorative justice based on a history of discrimi-
nation against minorities.  Instead, diversity is conceptualized on terms that 
are satisfactory to institutions like the University of Michigan Law School 
and the University of Texas, other colleges and universities, the military, and 
Fortune 500 companies that have no investment in rights remediation. 
C. How the Law Enables Reverse Passing 
We suggest that the erosion of a remedial affirmative action program, as 
well as the development of the racial diversity rationale by the courts, nar-
rowed the meaning of nonwhite racial identity.  Divorced from its historic 
and experiential context, nonwhite racial identity was reduced to a character-
istic any applicant could easily articulate on their college, graduate school, or 
employment applications simply by checking a box. 
Undergirded by the Era of Racial Self-Identification, whites seeking to 
reap direct benefits from affirmative action programs advancing the Court’s 
racial diversity interest could mark themselves as nonwhite.  The law—in the 
form of the U.S. Census regime and affirmative action jurisprudence—
enabled this process and increased the incidence of reverse passing. 
  
States military assert that, ‘[b]ased on [their] decades of experience,’ a ‘highly qualified, 
racially diverse officer corps . . . is essential to the military’s ability to fulfill its principle [sic] 
mission to provide national security’” (quoting Brief for Amicus Curiae of Julius W. Becton, 
Jr., et al. in Support of Respondents, Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (Nos. 02-
241, 02-516)). 
226. Rachel F. Moran, Of Doubt and Diversity: The Future of Affirmative Action in Higher 
Education, 67 OHIO ST. L.J. 201, 226 (2006). 
227. See supra note 224 and accompanying text. 
228. Moran, supra note 226, at 226. 
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1. Racial Capital and the Diversity Doctrine 
Under an affirmative action jurisprudential regime in which diversity 
stands as the exclusive compelling state interest, institutions clamor to build 
statistically and superficially diverse student bodies and employee bases.229  
Colleges, universities, and employers in both the private and public sectors 
view having a diverse group of students or employees as critical to their legit-
imacy for many of the same reasons articulated by the Supreme Court in 
Bakke, Grutter, and Fisher.  For example, employers champion diversity because 
they believe that it breeds innovation insofar as a diverse set of employees osten-
sibly bring differing views and perspectives that can help businesses thrive both 
domestically and globally.230  Colleges and universities actively seek out diver-
sity because they want students who offer differing viewpoints and life experi-
ences.231  In addition, institutions that lack diversity are often criticized and 
viewed negatively in the public discourse, which can affect the bottom line for 
businesses and the prestige and reputation of colleges and universities.232 
This “intense social and legal focus on diversity”233 incentivizes institutions—
like universities or state agencies—to admit or recruit individuals who appear to 
be nonwhite, or who can effectively perform a nonwhite identity.234  On the 
other side, enabled by the Era of Racial Self-Identification, individuals seeking 
to gain admission to a college or university, or to be more competitive for a job, 
can negotiate or manipulate their identities to appear to be “diverse.”235 
  
229. By “superficial,” we refer to the mere appearance of racial diversity an institution may seek, 
and the supposed credibility or legitimacy that mode of diversity brings. 
230. See FORBES, GLOBAL DIVERSITY AND INCLUSION: FOSTERING INNOVATION 
THROUGH A DIVERSE WORKFORCE 4 (“A diverse and inclusive workforce is necessary to 
drive innovation, foster creativity, and guide business strategies.  Multiple voices lead to new 
ideas, new services, and new products, and encourage out-of-the box thinking.”). 
231. See, e.g., Ronald G. Shaiko, Admissions Is Just Part of the Diversity Puzzle, CHRON. HIGHER 
EDUC. (June 9, 2013), http://chronicle.com/article/Admissions-Is-Just-Part-of-the/139637 
[https://perma.cc/YJ69-77AG] (describing the benefits of diversity on college campuses 
and the ways in which colleges can do more beyond just admissions to reap the benefits of 
race-conscious admissions policies). 
232. For example, the University of Wisconsin was heavily criticized for enrolling a non-racially 
diverse student body and relying upon deceptive means to make its university appear 
more diverse, including photoshopping an African-American student into a virtually all-white 
crowd in one of its advertisement brochures.  See Deena Prichep, A Campus More Colorful Than 
Reality: Beware That College Brochure, NPR (Dec. 29, 2013, 10:31 AM), http://www.npr. 
org/2013/12/29/257765543/a-campus-more-colorful-than-reality-beware-that-college-
brochure [https://perma.cc/RK9D-3M95]. 
233. Leong, supra note 57, at 12. 
234. Leong, supra note 33, at 2153–54. 
235. “Identity entrepreneurship takes place within a system of identity valuation that I will call 
identity capitalism.  In previous work, I identified the phenomenon of racial capitalism—the 
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Further, the preoccupation with diversity—particularly racial diversity—
engenders institutional commodification of nonwhite identity, and subse-
quently, nonwhite bodies.  Whether superficially, statistically, or strategically, 
“the specific racial commodity that each of us produces often provides . . . ‘use 
value’ to the people and institutions with which we affiliate.”236  Cognizant of 
this “use value,” whites seeking to capitalize on institutional missions to en-
hance racial diversity will present their racial identities in ways that comport 
with those missions, including reverse passing to personally reap the benefits 
of diversity policies. 
2. Racial Identity Entrepreneurship 
Nancy Leong defines racial identity entrepreneurship as “circumstances 
in which an individual of an identity out-group intentionally leverages her 
identity for personal benefit.”237  Adopting Leong’s theory, we argue that re-
verse passers shed white (“in-group”) identities for nonwhite (“out-group”) 
identities to derive some kind of personal benefit or benefits.238 
Within a framework wrought by the Supreme Court’s affirmative action 
jurisprudence, where racial diversity is intensely coveted by colleges and uni-
versities, sought after in the business world,239 and valued by government 
agencies, there are enough personal benefits waiting for whites who choose to 
reverse pass as nonwhite to make it reasonable, if not advantageous, to do so.  
These benefits include: seats at prestigious colleges and graduate programs; 
hotly contested positions at Fortune 500 companies and government agencies; 
academic appointments and professorships; executive roles with prominent 
civil rights and advocacy organizations; and a bounty of other opportunities.240 
In sum, the diversity doctrine set forth by the Supreme Court creates 
great incentives to reverse pass for whites who can effectively perform and 
  
process of deriving social or economic value from the racial identity of another.”  Leong, 
supra note 57, at 3. 
236. Id. at 9. 
237. Id. at 15. 
238. Leong refers to an individual “who intentionally leverages her out-group identity to derive 
social or economic benefit as an identity entrepreneur.”  Id. at 18. 
239. See Eang L. Ngov, War and Peace Between Title VII’s Disparate Impact Provision and the 
Equal Protection Clause: Battling for a Compelling Interest, 42 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 1, 50 (2010) 
(discussing the “business case for diversity”). 
240. See Leong, supra note 33, at 2169 (“[E]fforts to create racial diversity usually begin—and often 
end—with increasing the number of nonwhite people within a group or institution . . . [and] 
nonwhiteness has acquired a unique value because, in many contexts, it signals the presence of 
the prized characteristic of diversity.”). 
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present themselves as nonwhite.241  This is particularly true of the Era of Ra-
cial Self-Identification, where “people are not merely passive objects shaped 
by society, but are also active and creative agents of identity.”242  This proac-
tive shaping of identity includes reverse passing.  The following Part describes 
the ways in which persons seeking to reverse pass might do so and the benefits 
or incentives that exist that may encourage them to do so. 
III. FORMS OF REVERSE PASSING 
Reverse passing theory is complex, multi-dimensional, and—in line 
with the fluidity of race and racial classifications in America—constantly 
shifting.243  This is particularly true in the Era of Racial Self-Identification, 
which equips reverse passers with the legal footing to elect whatever race 
aligns with their subjective affinities or interests. 
This Part, through case law and timely case studies, examines two forms 
of reverse passing: legal reverse passing and cultural reverse passing.  It also 
examines the benefits that might accrue from both of these forms of reverse 
passing.  Part III.A analyzes legal reverse passing and its three attendant ben-
efits: (1) access to higher education opportunities, (2) access to employment 
opportunities, and (3) economic gains.  Part III.B scrutinizes cultural reverse 
passing and its two subcategories: (1) political reverse passing, and (2) social 
reverse passing. 
Legal and cultural reverse passing are distinct, but they commonly overlap 
and bring about full-fledged reverse passing.  In other words, reverse passers 
oftentimes legally and culturally reverse pass simultaneously.  In some in-
stances, as indicated below, reverse passers may opt to legally reverse pass but 
continue to culturally identify as white, or vice-versa.  This Part aims to artic-
ulate the distinct ways reverse passing is deployed by reverse passers, and the 
myriad effects it has on the subject, associated figures, and the institutions in 
which they engage. 
  
241. Reverse passing, an extreme form of identity performance, “consumes resources in the form 
of time and effort . . . .”  Carbado & Gulati, supra note 17, at 1279.  However, for reverse 
passers, the costs associated with the decision to reverse pass—as discussed above—come 
with potential for great reward.  This rational negotiation is indeed part of the decision to 
reverse pass from white to nonwhite. 
242. Khanna & Johnson supra note 3, at 383. 
243. See Omi & Winant, supra note 77, at 68. 
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A. Legal Reverse Passing 
Legal reverse passing is the process by which whites disavow their white 
identity and present themselves as per se nonwhite on legal and administra-
tive documents.  This Part describes the benefits that might accrue from le-
gal reverse passing and demonstrates why whites might have the incentive to 
do so. 
1. Access to Higher Education 
I tell my children to always choose Hispanic or Latino based on the 
positives they stand to gain from doing so.  Yup, I said it. 
      —Allena Tapia244 
Affirmative action in higher education created newfound inroads for 
nonwhites to access colleges and universities.  This is particularly true for 
prestigious institutions, which are gateways to influence, wealth, and power 
in America.  The elimination of affirmative action as a corrective mechanism 
by the Court, and the ascent of the diversity justification, opened the door for 
“box checking”—the phenomenon by which college applicants seek to gain 
advantages in the diversity-driven admissions system by selecting a racial or 
ethnic classification that they believe will enhance their prospect for admis-
sion.245  Box checking, a specific kind of reverse passing in higher education, 
is not exclusive to whites, but is also practiced among nonwhites choosing 
other nonwhite categories that colleges, universities, and graduate programs 
actively recruit.246  That nonwhites would elect to identify as another but dif-
  
244. Multiracial Children: Teaching My Kids to Check the Latino Box on Applications, 
HUFFINGTON POST (Apr. 12, 2012, 12:10 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/allena/ 
why-i-tell-my-children-to-game-the-latino-statistics_b_1386351.html 
[https://perma.cc/P9SV-4Y7K]. 
245. “Today, some people have flipped the ‘one-drop rule’ to claim minority status to try to gain 
perceived advantages in scholarships, college admission and in the workplace.  In response, 
the Coalition of Bar Associations of Color passed a resolution last year urging law schools to 
treat the practice of ‘box checking’ as ‘academic ethnic fraud.’”  Elise Hu, Minority Rules: 
Who Gets to Claim Status as a Person of Color?, NPR (May 16, 2012, 12:41 PM), 
http://www.npr.org/sections/itsallpolitics/2012/05/16/152822762/minority-rules-who-gets-
to-claim-status-as-a-person-of-color [https://perma.cc/YZY7-N53P]; see also Jessica A. 
Clarke, Identity and Form, 103 CAL. L. REV. 747, 805 (2015), who observes: “The ABA’s 
evidence of fraud was the disparity between the number of self-identified Native American 
lawyers on the census (228) and the number reportedly graduated by ABA-accredited law 
schools over that same time period (approximately 2,610).” 
246. The most noted incident involved Vijay Chokal-Ingam, the Indian-American brother of 
actress Mindy Kaling, who administratively passed as Black in order to maximize his 
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ferent person of color for purposes of the college admissions process aptly il-
lustrates the revised incentive structure that now exists with respect to racial 
identification.  Whereas in the past, all nonwhites had an incentive to identify 
as white, an incentive now exists for them not only to maintain a nonwhite 
identity, but to assume one that is perceived as valuable to college admissions 
officers for purposes of creating diversity.247 
Similarly, a diversity-driven affirmative action in education model po-
tentially creates great rewards for white reverse passers as well.  The admis-
sions incentives also greatly outweigh the risks associated with reverse 
passing, since colleges and universities do not closely scrutinize the adminis-
trative racial identification of candidates pre- and post-admission.  Stated 
simply: “All it would take is filling in one tiny box on one very long applica-
tion, an almost imperceptible lie that’s essentially impossible to disprove, and 
one that can significantly increase a student’s chances of being accepted into 
college.”248  Indeed, one survey conducted a year after the Grutter and Gratz 
decisions found that, “73 percent [of white students questioned] said that 
they would lie about their ethnicity on college applications if there was no way 
for colleges to refute their claims,”249 as a means for enhancing prospects for 
admission.250  A hot topic on college and graduate admissions discussion 
boards, “lying about your race” illustrates the tremendous incentives reverse 
passing offers white applicants.251 
  
prospects for gaining admission into medical school.  “In my junior year of college, I realized 
that I didn’t have the grades or test scores to get into medical school, at least not as an 
Indian-American . . . .”  Kipp Jones, Mindy Kaling’s Brother Lied About Being Black to Get 




247. Id. (“I was determined to become a doctor and I knew that admission standards for certain 
minorities under affirmative action were, let’s say . . . less stringent?”). 
248. John Visclosky, Re-Writing Race for College Applications, SILVER CHIPS ONLINE (Nov. 12, 
2004), http://silverchips.mbhs.edu/story/4265 [https://perma.cc/5TWW-FHZ4]. 
249. Id. 
250. Id. 
251. A Hot Topic: Lying About Your Race, STUDENT DR. NETWORK: FORUMS (Nov. 11, 2006), 
http://forum.studentdoctor.net/threads/a-hot-topic-lying-about-your-race.338722 
[https://perma.cc/UH6J-JDDX] (featuring a medical student blog that contains a 
discussion, geared for medical students and medical school applicants, about the advantages 
and disadvantages, benefits, and risks associated with whites choosing an underrepresented 
minority category on the American Medical College Application Service (AMCAS) 
application). 
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Candidates might also leverage amenable phenotypes as bases to reverse 
pass for admissions purposes.  In an admissions blog titled I Lied About My 
Ethnicity to Get into a Better College, an anonymous candidate revealed: 
I have an Italian last name but I’m only 25% Italian.  I’m mostly 
norwegian, welsh, and english.  In the summer I get a golden tan 
and when I spike my hair up, my friends told me [I] look Puerto 
Rican.  Whenever I go to Florida I get brown . . . like dark Mexi-
can or even Indian brown . . . . I really wanted to get into this one 
highly selective school and my grades and ACT were only slightly 
above average.  When they asked about my ethnicity I put down 
Hispanic . . . . Three weeks later I got my acceptance letter.252 
While the empirical research examining the incidence and prevalence of box 
checking is, at best, scant, anecdotal evidence and the admissions of anony-
mous students on online blogs and forums strongly suggests that it is more 
than negligible and that the perceived advantages of being nonwhite might 
indeed create an incentive to reverse pass. 
In addition to checking off a nonwhite classification on the application 
form itself, “[t]here is an incentive for applicants to structure their personal 
statements to align with the particular diversity benefits they believe their tar-
get colleges or universities seek to advance.”253  Certainly, the decision to iden-
tify as nonwhite on a college application, and administratively reverse pass, 
burdens white applicants to fabricate narratives in personal statements, addenda, 
and admission interviews to sell their skin.254  In addition, it oftentimes creates 
burdens and expectations pre-and post-admission to perform the racial identity 
into which they have reverse passed, for example through social or extracurricular 
involvement.255 
Beyond structuring personal statements and applications, college appli-
cants are spending time and resources to investigate “their ethnic ancestries and 
  
252. Keentan420, I Lied About My Ethnicity to Get Into a Better College, REDDIT: CONFESSIONS 
(Nov. 2, 2013), https://www.reddit.com/r/confession/comments/1pqg5k/i_lied_about_my_ 
ethnicity_to_get_into_a_better [https://perma.cc/QG3E-SWGP]. 
253. Devon W. Carbado, Intraracial Diversity, 60 UCLA L. REV. 1130, 1160 (2013). 
254. The process of “selling one’s skin” capitalizes on the perceived or prospective benefits one’s 
racial identity may garner in the admission process.  In other words, it is the process of racial 
capitalism theorized by Leong.  See generally Leong, supra note 33. 
255. See Chokal-Ingam, supra note 149.  Chokal-Ingam’s administrative reverse passing as a 
Black man was followed by pressure to do so manifestly at the University of Chicago: “I 
shaved my head, trimmed my long Indian eyelashes, joined the University of Chicago’s 
Organization of Black Students (a black friend ran it, knew my scam and got me in) and 
began applying to medical schools as a black man.  I transposed my middle name with my 
first name and became Jojo, the African-American applicant.”  Id. 
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backgrounds through genetic testing in order to assert a minority identity.”256  
Further illustrating the growing cognizance among students about the in-
centives attached to racial identification in the high-stakes world of college 
admissions, white students may alternatively “decline to state,” choosing to 
appear racially ambiguous on applications instead of affirmatively choosing 
to reverse pass.257 
2. Access to Employment Opportunities 
Paul and Phillip Malone, twin brothers who lived in Milton, Massachu-
setts, were aspiring firemen with great ambition.258  The Brothers Malone 
participated in a 1975 citywide exam competition for positions with the Bos-
ton Fire Department (BFD).259  They identified as white on the job applica-
tion.260  Both scored poorly on the entrance exam, and were not extended 
offers to join the BFD. 
Two years later, and after the BFD “became subject to a court-ordered 
affirmative action program,” the Brothers Malone reapplied for the same po-
sitions.261  This time, however, they checked off “Black” on the application.262  
Paul’s and Philip’s second set of exam scores were 57 and 69, respectively,263 
and earned them positions on the BFD under a special set-aside program 
aimed at increasing the number of Black persons on the BFD.264  Their 
scores, however, were lower than the 82 scored by the lowest-scoring white 
applicant to earn a position on the BFD.265  Sometime between being rejected 
for positions with the BFD in 1975 and their decision to retake the examina-
tion as Black men, or reverse passers, the Brothers Malone recognized that 
  
256. Angela Onwuachi-Willig, The Admission of Legacy Blacks, 60 VAND. L. REV. 1141, 1217–18 
(2007). 
257. See generally Rich, Decline to State, supra note 56 (describing how the majority of law students 
who decline to state their race on applications are white males and positing that they may 
strategically opt to not check off a racial category in order to maximize their prospects for 
admission). 
258. Susan Diesenhouse, Boston Case Raises Questions on Misuse of Affirmative Action, N.Y. TIMES 
(Oct. 9, 1988), http://www.nytimes.com/1988/10/09/us/boston-case-raises-questions-on-
misuse-of-affirmative-action.html [https://perma.cc/7LTC-8NER]. 
259. Malone v. Haley, No. 88-339, 2 (Sup. Jud. Ct. for Suffolk Cty., Mass. July 25, 1989). 
260. Id. 
261. Christopher A. Ford, Administering Identity: The Determination of “Race” in Race-Conscious 
Law, 82 CAL. L. REV. 1231, 1232 (1994). 
262. Malone v. Haley, No. 88-339, 2 (Sup. Jud. Ct. Suffolk Cty., Mass. July 25, 1989). 
263. Id. 
264. Id. at 2 (“[T]he Boston Fire Department [was] subject to a federal consent decree entered in 
1975 in NAACP v. Beecher, C.A. No. 72-3060-F (D. Mass.).”). 
265. Id. at 2 fn. 2. 
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formal identification as Black men enabled their access to jobs they were pre-
viously denied as white men.266  Similar to reverse passers today, they sought 
to take advantage of perceived benefits of legal reverse passing as nonwhite. 
Legal reverse passing enabled the twins—who previously identified as 
white on employment-related documents—to not only benefit from the 
court-enforced affirmative action program adopted by BDF, which aimed to 
diversify the roster of firemen and women, but build ten-year careers within 
it.267  For the Brothers Malone, the employment incentives for self-identifying as 
Black under a diversity-driven affirmative action regime delivered employment 
opportunities previously inaccessible to them.  Remaining white, or choosing 
not to reverse pass on the BFD’s administrative documents, would have disa-
bled access to the positions and prevented the decade-long careers the 
Brothers Malone had with the BFD. 
After the Malone brothers were fired, they challenged their termination 
in Court, but Judge Herbert Wilkins Judge Herbert Wilkins agreed that 
“there is was no evidence that the Malones identified themselves personally or 
socially as Black.”268  Judge Wilkins continued: “[T]he Malones did not claim 
Black status honestly or in good faith,”269 aside from the specific and inten-
tional purpose of “claiming jobs and promotion” in the BFD.270  In the pro-
cess, the Malones took the positions away from bona fide and qualified Black 
applicants, and, in turn, undermined the BFD affirmative action program’s 
stated aim of diversifying their roster of firemen. 
The Malones’s decision to legally reverse pass as Black was not a means 
of existential expression or cultural assimilability, but—very plainly—was 
done because checking the Black box, instead of the white one, would enhance 
  
266. See, e.g., Kennedy, supra note 5, at 1150.  A type of “temporary passing,” where passers or 
reverse passers choose to do so to “advance occupational ambition” and identify as Black by 
day and white by night, the Brothers Malone limited their self-identification as Black to the 
workplace, but based on the court record, held themselves out to be white beyond it.  Id. 
267. Judge Wilkins of the Supreme Judicial Court for the Suffolk County of Massachusetts set 
forth a three-part test for assessing the Malone’s self-identification as Black: “[T]he 
Malones might have supported their claim to be Black[:] (1) by visual observation of their 
features; (2) by appropriate documentary evidence, such as birth certificates, establishing 
Black ancestry; or (3) by evidence that they or their families hold themselves out to be Black 
and are considered to be Black in the community.”  Malone, No. 88-339 at 16.  Judge 
Wilkins ruled that the Brothers Malone did not meet any of these criteria. 
268. Id. at 19. 
269. Id. at 20. 
270. Ford, supra note 261, at 1233; see also Kennedy, supra note 5, at 1190 (discussing how the 
Malones where found out to be white, and “racial imposters,” when seeking a promotion 
with the BFD). 
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access to two coveted positions with the BFD.271  While Judge Wilkins affirmed 
the BFD personnel administration’s firing of the Malones, the brothers success-
fully built decade-long careers reaping the professional, personal, and financial 
benefits of serving on the BFD as white firemen legally classified as Black.272  
The case, twenty-five years later, continues to provide a vivid illustration of 
and telling precedent for the common phenomenon of legal reverse passing with-
in the employment context. 
Many years after the ruling in Haley v. Malone, an upstart professor and 
scholar followed in the footprints of the Brothers Malone.  Andrea Smith taught, 
researched, and wrote in the area of Native American Studies, beginning her ca-
reer in 2002 as an assistant professor at the University of Michigan’s flagship Ann 
Arbor campus.273  Smith had a double appointment at the University of Mich-
igan, teaching in the American Culture and Women’s Studies Depart-
ments.274  Smith’s racial identity came to the fore during a tense dispute about 
her tenure during which she received the backing of the American Culture 
Department while the senior faculty of the Women’s Studies Department 
voted against her.275 
Smith’s supporters believed she was Native American, and, specifically, 
Cherokee.276  Smith did not qualify or contest these assertions, despite know-
ing through ancestral research that she was white and had “no connection to 
the Cherokee tribe.”277  But instead of revealing the truth, Smith remained 
  
271. See Bella English, Color Coordinated, BOSTON GLOBE, Oct. 12, 1988, at 21 (affirming the 
conclusion that the Brothers Malone, who identified themselves as white on the 1986 
Census in Milton, Washington reverse passed for the sole purposes of procuring jobs, and 
later promotions, with the BFD). 
272. Ford, supra note 261, at 1234 (“[B]y the time Judge Wilkins’ opinion came down [in 1989], 
eleven firefighters were under investigation on similar grounds.”). 
273. See Media and Cultural Studies Faculty—Andrea Smith, U.C. RIVERSIDE, http://mcs.ucr. 
edu/andrea-smith-associate-professor [https://perma.cc/K9EY-5Y6W] for Smith’s faculty 
profile showing she currently teaches in the Media and Cultural Studies Department at the 
University of California at Riverside. 
274. Scott Jaschik, Concern Over Michigan Tenure Case, INSIDE HIGHER EDUC. (Mar. 10, 
2008), https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2008/03/10/smith [https://perma.cc/ZZ45-
2DEY]. 
275. Scott Jaschik, Fake Cherokee?, INSIDE HIGHER EDUC. (July 6, 2015), https://www.inside 
highered.com/news/2015/07/06/scholar-who-has-made-name-cherokee-accused-not-
having-native-american-roots [https://perma.cc/NS3E-RA6V]. 
276. Jaschik, supra note 274 (“A Cherokee, she is also among a very small group of Native 
American scholars who have won positions at top research universities.”). 
277. Samantha Allen, Meet the Native American Rachel Dolezal, DAILY BEAST (June 30, 2015, 
5:55 PM), http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2015/06/30/meet-the-native-american-
rachel-dolezal.html [https://perma.cc/E6W4-AQWW]. 
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silent.278  She facilitated the acceptance of the veracity of these statements by 
way of silence and “selective disclosure,”279 endorsing the broad popular belief 
that she was in fact Cherokee.280  Smith’s silence and selective disclosure 
amount to what Carbado and Gulati call “strategic performance.”281  Through 
active and passive behavior, concealing the truth about her identity and as-
serting that she was Cherokee in specific contexts, Smith’s strategic perfor-
mance adjusted to the context and to the risks her reverse passing posed in 
different contexts.282 
This strategic performance by Smith suggests the likelihood that Smith 
formally identified as Native American, and namely, Cherokee, on her Uni-
versity of Michigan job application and tenure packet.283  Like the college 
admissions context, college and university departments—particularly faculties 
in American Culture and Women’s Studies—have strong interests in recruit-
ing, hiring, and promoting professors of color for purposes of increasing di-
versity amongst the faculty ranks.284  As a result, Smith may have understood 
that reverse passing would strengthen her position while fighting for tenure.  
Reverse passing furnished Smith with professional upward mobility, academic 
  
278. Jaschik, supra note 275 (“Steve Russell, an emeritus professor at Indiana University at 
Bloomington whose research is on Native American Studies, is among those cited by the 
blog [http://andreasmithisnotcherokee.tumblr.com], and he confirmed to Inside Higher Ed 
that he received a direct promise from Smith to stop calling herself Cherokee.”). 
279. Khanna & Johnson, supra note 3, at 386–87. 
280. An article drafted following her denial of tenure at the University of Michigan observed: 
“Smith is extremely popular with her students, and also has a notable publishing record, 
with her books and essays appearing on many a syllabus.  A Cherokee, she is also among a 
very small group of Native American scholars who have won positions at top research 
universities.”  Jaschik, supra note 274. 
281. Carbado & Gulati, supra note 17, at 1277. 
282. Carbado and Gulati observed that “[s]trategic behavior can also be risky and can backfire.”  Id.  
In Smith’s case, she hedged risks by explicitly identifying herself as Cherokee in contexts where 
the possibility of outing was relatively minimal (on social media, Twitter), while concealing the 
truth in contexts in which the likelihood of her outing was higher.  Ironically, the former led to 
her outing.  See Top American Indian Scholar Outed As Fake, DAILY CALLER (July 6, 2015), 
http://dailycaller.com/2015/07/06/top-american-indian-scholar-outed-as-fake-indian/#ixzz4 
PpJyNJyj [https://perma.cc/8YAB-ERP2] (describing the controversy over Andrea Smith’s 
claims of Native ancestry and noting that “much of the attack on Smith is coming from an 
anonymous, but well-sourced, Tumblr blog”). 
283. Allen, supra note 277.  In a meeting with David Cornsilk, an ancestral researcher who 
worked for Cherokee Geneology Services, Smith stated, “[my] employment depended on 
finding proof of Indian heritage.”  Id.  
284. For an example of formal university programs to recruit more faculty of color, see generally 
SUE GUENTER-SCHLESINGER & KUNLE OKUKUTU, W. MICH. UNIV., BEST 
PRACTICES: RECRUITING AND RETAINING FACULTY AND STAFF OF COLOR, (2009), 
https://www.wwu.edu/eoo/docs/Best%20Practices_Recruiting%20and%20Retaining%20Sta
ff%20of%20Color.pdf. 
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visibility, and caché before the tenure dispute, from which she continued to benefit 
following the dispute, even after learning through genealogical research—on two 
occasions—that she lacked any evidence of Cherokee heritage.285 
Smith’s public and academic profile did not diminish, despite her being 
outed as falsifying her identity, as she remains employed as a tenured profes-
sor at the University of California at Riverside.286  Patti Jo King, interim chair 
of American Indian Studies, Director of the Center for American Indians at 
Bacone College, and a member of the Cherokee Tribe, observed: 
But instead of coming clean and showing herself to be a true advocate 
for Native women, she continued her deception, proving to me that 
she is merely masquerading for money . . . She is not the first to do 
this—indeed, there are hundreds of ‘pretend Indians’ who use the 
guise to sell their ‘authentic’ books to an unsuspecting and naïve pub-
lic.  Although we have tried to enlighten the public for decades about 
our objection to [this] kind of identity fraud, the pretenders seem to 
feel they have a perfect right to misrepresent themselves.287 
King’s emphasis on “deception” echoes the definition of passing offered by Ran-
dall, highlighting that Smith’s reverse passing from white to Cherokee veers closer 
to the “morally disallowable” type of passing since she was not facing or enduring 
“immoral oppression.”288 
Second, her reference to “pretend Indians” recalls one of the more infamous 
reverse passers, Asa Earl Carter, a once-prominent Alabama Klansmen who re-
made himself into Forrest Carter, a Cherokee novelist.289  As a “pretend Indian[]” 
author,290 Carter penned The Rebel Outlaw: Josey Wales, Cry Geronimo!, Dances 
  
285. Allen, supra note 277. 
286. See Andrea Smith, Faculty, U.C. RIVERSIDE: MEDIA & CULTURAL STUDIES, 
http://mcs.ucr.edu/andrea-smith-associate-professor/ [https://perma.cc/AGZ7-59LT]. 
287. Jaschik, supra note 275. 
288. Kennedy, supra note 5, at 1182 (“The real issue, though, is not whether a passer deceives; as 
I have defined passing, deception is an essential part of the enterprise.  The issue is how to 
assess the deception. . . . Some are morally allowable, while others are not.  It is one thing to 
lie to a murderer to protect a prospective victim. . . . For purposes of escaping immoral 
oppression, the presumption against dishonesty is overcome.”). 
289. See The Artful Reinvention of Klansman Asa Earl Carter, NPR (Apr. 20, 2012, 4:28 PM) 
http://www.npr.org/2012/04/20/151037079/the-artful-reinvention-of-klansman-asa-earl-
carter [https://perma.cc/GAG4-9PVF ] (“Asa Earl Carter was a Ku Klux Klan organizer, a 
rabid segregationist and a talk show host who expounded on the dangers of integration.  In 
1963, he drafted an inaugural address for Alabama Gov. George Wallace that would become 
one of the most notorious speeches in the civil rights era.  ‘In the name of the greatest 
people that have trod this earth,’ Wallace said, ‘I draw the line in the dust and toss the 
gauntlet before the feet of tyranny, and I say segregation now, segregation tomorrow, 
segregation forever!’”). 
290. Jaschik, supra note 275. 
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With Wolves, and other bestselling works of fiction later remade into Hollywood 
blockbusters.291  Like Carter, who engineered a “carefully constructed mask of 
[a] . . . Cherokee cowboy, self-taught writer and spokesman for Native Ameri-
cans”292 for ostensibly economic and visibility gains, Smith reverse passed from 
white to Cherokee to bolster her legitimacy within her academic discipline and the 
broader public sphere. 
Furthermore, like the Brothers Malone and Forrest Carter,293 Smith’s pri-
mary motive was likely broader than just money itself: She sought to build a ca-
reer, along with the tangible and intangible benefits that would emanate from it.  
Even after promising Native American scholars in private meetings that she 
would no longer identify or hold herself out as a member of the Cherokee Na-
tion, Smith continued to reverse pass.294  As early as 1991, and for the duration of 
more than two decades, she stayed the course—and at minimum, made no at-
tempt to reveal her genuine racial identity or counter the discursive belief that she 
was a member of the Cherokee Nation.295 
For Smith, the academic appointments, professional access, book 
deals, advocacy and organizational platforms, validation as an indige-
nous scholar, invitations to participate in conferences and to deliver key-
note addresses,296 honoraria and awards,297 and Nobel Peace Prize 
  




293. Id. (“The senior class prophet predicted he would return to Calhoun County as a ‘famous 
movie star.’ . . . Handsome, energetic, ambitious, always the actor, his classmates had known 
that Asa Carter would do whatever he had to to escape the sleepy little Alabama town of 
Oxford.”). 
294. See Native American Institute, Steve Russell Part 02 of 04, YOUTUBE (May 5, 2009), 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=uueHK9K8q8Y [https://perma.cc/X27X-TYHA]. 
295. See Mary Elizabeth Williams, Two Prominent Native Americans Accused of Faking Their Cherokee 




296. See Allen, supra note 277 (“I first saw Andrea Smith in 2013 when she delivered a keynote at 
the Southeastern Women’s Studies Association (SEWSA) conference and, although her 
program bio did not explicitly mention that she was Cherokee, she was widely understood 
by conference goers to be a Native American speaker.”). 
297. “For every scholarship she received as a Native person, for every honorarium she has received 
as an Indigenous speaker, for her book sales that a publisher sold as coming from a 
‘Cherokee’ author, those recognitions came at the expense of some student who wasn’t funded, 
some speaker who wasn’t invited, or some book by an Indigenous author that wasn’t bought.”  
David Shorter, Four Words for Andrea Smith: “I Am Not an Indian”, INDIAN COUNTRY (Jul. 1, 
2015), http://indiancountrytodaymedianetwork.com/2015/07/01/four-words-andrea-smith-
im-not-indian. 
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nomination,298 were ample incentives to reverse pass, even in the face of 
bona fide Native American scholars asking her to reveal her true identity.  
Her decision to reverse pass, allegedly both on formal applications and 
through silence, netted Smith considerable gains.  And within a landscape 
where academic diversity is culturally coveted and legally sanctioned she 
took away opportunities from actual Native American—particularly 
Cherokee—scholars.299 
Charles Lawrence observed that the academy is “a place where inequality 
is institutionalized and rationalized.”300  Smith, a progressive scholar, was ful-
ly cognizant of this inequality within the academy, but continued to reverse 
pass as Native American to capitalize on scarce opportunities available to 
nonwhite scholars, and within her specific area, Native scholars.  By choosing 
to reverse pass to access these opportunities, Smith advanced her personal in-
terests, but exacerbated the institutional racial inequality she frequently spoke 
out against. 
In June 2015, roughly two weeks after Dolezal was revealed to be white, 
Smith was finally outed by a blog called “Andrea Smith is Not Cherokee.”301  
The blog, administered by a Native American graduate student at Washing-
ton State University, included an extensive archive of news articles and private 
communications—spanning from 1993 to the present—documenting that 
Smith was white and had reverse passed for more than two decades for pro-
fessional gain.302  The “decoding capacity” of the blog’s manager,303 and the 
irrefutable evidence she compiled, instantly caused Smith to close her Twitter 
account, retreat from the social media and public spheres, and, despite her 
own claims that she is in fact Cherokee, publicly end her twenty-three-year 
long reverse passing campaign.304 
  
298. Jaschik, supra note 275. 
299. See Allen, supra note 277 (“Ethnic fraud is harmful to tribes and sometimes to individual real 
Indians if they are passed over for a fake in a job that really does call for a tribal person.”). 
300. Charles R. Lawrence III, Passing and Trespassing in the Academy: On Whiteness as Property and 
Racial Performance as Political Speech, 31 HARV. J. RACIAL & ETHNIC JUST. 7, 9 (2015). 
301. Andrea Smith Is Not Cherokee, TUMBLR, http://andreasmithisnotcherokee.tumblr.com 
[https://perma.cc/RQY2-ZULQ]. 
302. Id. 
303. Yoshino, supra note 4, at 822 (“In his discussion of passing, Erving Goffman observed that 
passing depends not only on the performance of the individual attempting to conceal the 
trait, but also on the ‘decoding capacity’ of her audience.” (citing ERVING GOFFMAN, 
STIGMA: NOTES ON THE MANAGEMENT OF SPOILED IDENTITY 48–51 (1963))). 
304. “I have consistently identified myself based on what I knew to be true.  My enrollment 
status does not impact my Cherokee identity or my continued commitment to organizing 
for justice for Native communities.”  Andrea Smith, My Statement on the Current Media 
Controversy, ANDREA SMITH’S BLOG (July 9, 2015), https://andrea366.wordpress.com/ 
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3. Other Economic Benefits 
Economic benefits exclusively afforded to nonwhites also prompt reverse 
passing.  For instance, government grants and loans specifically reserved for 
minority groups,305 geared to diversify a specific industry or area of business or 
to remedy past racial discrimination,306 create economic incentives to reverse 
pass.  By claiming to be nonwhite, a white business owner thus may be able to 
access grants or loans otherwise unavailable to her. 
Mirroring the benefits that might be received from legal reverse passing 
in the employment context, economic reverse passing requires that a business 
owner, or chief of operations, identify as a member of a racial minority.  
However, instead of seeking to procure the benefits attached to nonwhiteness 
for individual gain, economic reverse passers will formally identify as 
nonwhite to retain benefits for the business entity.307  Yet the incentive re-
mains the same.  For white business owners, the decision to reverse pass 
might open the door for a number of grants, loans, and government contracts 
exclusively set aside for nonwhites, and more narrowly, “Small Disadvantaged 
Businesses (SDB).”308 
For example, a Boston business owner sought to reverse pass as Black to 




305. See Lee Grayson, Tax Incentives for Using a Minority-Owned Business, CHRON, 
http://smallbusiness.chron.com/tax-incentives-using-minorityowned-business-30659.html 
[https://perma.cc/S7W6-D6LG] (“The federal government passed the first laws offering 
legislative provisions encouraging minority-owned businesses under President Richard 
Nixon’s administration.  Nixon’s Executive Order 11458, passed in 1969, created the Office 
of Minority Business Enterprise (OMBE).”). 
306. This mission drove the affirmative action programs employed by the respondents in Adarand 
and Croson, examined in Part II of this Article. 
307. These are not always mutually exclusive, or distinct.  The business owner or executive reaps 
the greatest reward attached to revenue or profit.  However, this distinction is being made to 
highlight how reverse passing in the employment context is more micro-oriented while the 
reverse passing in the economic context has a macro, institutional impact. 
308. See Small Disadvantaged Businesses, U.S. SMALL BUS. ADMIN., https://www.sba.gov/ 
content/disadvantaged-businesses [https://perma.cc/V7CQ-K7NR].  To qualify as an Small 
Disadvantaged Business (SBA), a business must meet the following mandate: “The firm 
must be 51% or more owned and control by one or more disadvantaged persons.  The 
disadvantaged person or persons must be socially disadvantaged and economically disadvantaged.  
The firm must be small, according to SBA’s size standards.”  Id. 
309. U.S. Att’ys Office Dist. of Mass., Sterling Business Owner Sentenced for Claiming to Be 
Minority, Service-Disabled Veteran Operated Businesses, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. (June 28, 2013), 
https://www.justice.gov/usao-ma/pr/sterling-business-owner-sentenced-claiming-be-
minority-service-disabled-veteran-operated [https://perma.cc/2H3L-6WQ8] (“Tyrone 
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[Tyrone] Jones and his co-conspirators submitted false statements 
to the Small Business Administration and other government agen-
cies, to get federal contract awards that were set aside for or prefer-
entially awarded to disadvantaged minority and service-disabled 
veteran-owned and operated businesses.  The submissions falsely 
represented that that their company was owned and managed by a 
minority and service-disabled veteran who purportedly managed 
the daily operations of the business.310 
Unlike in the educational context, legal reverse passing for purposes of access-
ing certain government-sponsored business opportunities gives rise to the 
crime of fraud,311 thereby presumptively tempering the incentive to reverse 
pass to access loans, grants, and SBA grants.  However, as illustrated by the 
Jones case, the high-stakes and lucrative world of government contracts still 
spurs some to legally reverse pass for economic gain. 
B. Cultural Reverse Passing 
A second form of reverse passing is what this Article calls cultural re-
verse passing.  The parameters of cultural reverse passing are illustrated in an 
opinion article written in the immediate wake of Dolezal’s outing by Univer-
sity of Southern California School of Law Professor Camille Gear Rich.312  
Based on her elective race framework,313 Rich issued a trenchant defense of 
Dolezal as a cultural reverse passer.  She centered social exposure, condition-
ing, and culture as the baselines for her position that “Rachel Dolezal has a 
right to be Black.”314  And, presumptively, she observed that since race is a so-
cial construction, the construction of that tenet should be extended to allow 
individuals with no biological nexus to Blackness, like Dolezal, to still be able 
to identify as Black.  Rich observed: 
Growing up in a family with black siblings exposed Dolezal to the re-
ality of discrimination and made her more sensitive to its effects.  It 
probably helped her understand the contract between the reality of 
black lives and white privilege.  Other similar experiences, such as 
  
Jones, 48, was sentenced by U.S. District Court Judge Timothy S. Hillman to one year and 
one day in prison, to be followed by two years of supervised release.  Jones was also ordered 
to forfeit $399,000 [in SBA funds].”). 
310. Id. 
311. See id. 
312. Rich, supra note 144. 
313. See generally Rich, supra note 56. 
314. Rich, supra note 144. 
340 64 UCLA L. REV. 282 (2017) 
 
marrying an African-American and having black children, also 
make white people [like Dolezal] more sensitive to racism.315 
For Rich, “sensitivity to racism,” racial association, and relationships were not 
only portals for understanding African-American plight, perspectives, and 
culture, but also for reverse passing.316 
Some proponents base their support of cultural reverse passing on the 
benefits it ostensibly creates for the nonwhite group into which the subject re-
verse passes.  For instance, some defended Rachel Dolezal for working to ad-
vance the interest of Blacks, or “break down conscious or unconscious prejudices 
held by individual in-group [white] members.”317  Others center their defense 
along lines of individual autonomy, which for these proponents trumps the 
importance of geological or ancestral connections to a nonwhite group.318 
Notwithstanding one’s views on the propriety of cultural reverse passing, 
this Part highlights the benefits that might accrue from cultural reverse pass-
ing that might incentivize whites to do so. 
1. Political Benefits 
Two years into his second term as President of the United States, while 
mired in imminent impeachment proceedings, talk of Bill Clinton’s “Blackness” 
rose from an unexpected place.  Toni Morrison, the celebrated Black novelist 
and social commentator, stated that the embattled Clinton was being im-
peached because of his “Blackness.”319  In The New Yorker, Morrison recon-
structed Clinton’s racial identity from white to Black: “[W]hite skin 
notwithstanding, this is our first black President.  Blacker than any actual black 
person who could ever be elected in our children’s lifetime.  After all, Clinton 
displays almost every trope of blackness: single-parent household, born poor, 
working-class, saxophone-playing, McDonald’s-and-junk-food-loving boy 
  
315. Id. 
316. “Dolezal is disturbing for many people because she marks a cultural fault line.  Like it or not, 
we have entered into an era of elective race—a time when people expect that one has a right 
and dignity to claim the identity of one’s choice.”  Rich, supra note 144.  The justifications 
Rich posits in favor of Dolezal’s claiming Black identity are, not coincidentally, also 
leveraged by whites to rationalize racially insensitive or racist language or behavior.  “The 
news is replete with individuals asserting that they cannot be racist because they are, 
themselves, racial minorities, or because they have non-white friends, family members, or 
associates.”  Leong, supra note 57, at 23–24. 
317. Leong, supra note 57, at 58. 
318. See Kennedy, supra note 5, at 1188. 
319. Toni Morrison, Comment, NEW YORKER (Oct. 5, 1998), http://www.newyorker.com/ 
magazine/1998/10/05/comment-6543 [https://perma.cc/429G-KA53]. 
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from Arkansas.”320  Morrison, an esteemed figure in the Black community, 
not only named Clinton America’s “first black President,” but did so on the 
strength of an upbringing marred by poverty, musical preferences, and eating 
habits, which considerably influenced how people—particularly African-
Americans—viewed him.321  In Clinton’s case, “proximity to blackness is in-
vested with the power to turn whites black.”322  Here, Morrison echoes Rich’s 
observation that exposure to Black culture may sometimes serve as a proxy 
for, or even supplant, biological Blackness. 
Clinton was by no means a reverse passer, but his political performance and 
embrace of that title was likely more than just a source of pride.323  Indeed, within 
the political sphere, it was a coronation that brought legitimacy, value, and en-
hanced resonance with Black voters.324  Rich’s position that “Rachel Dolezal has a 
right to be Black” assumes that Clinton, so long as he embraced Morrison’s title, 
would also have the elective right to be Black.325 
Clinton’s “Blackness,” although not self-assigned and thus beyond the 
framework of reverse passing, sheds much light on the motives of reverse 
passing within “political spaces.”  For the purposes of this Article, we define 
political spaces broadly to include government, electoral politics, advocacy, 
and grassroots organizing work.  Twenty years before it became a trending 
topic and the focus of legal scholarship, Morrison’s declaration of Clinton’s 
Blackness seeded the notion that reverse passing—outside and within the po-
litical realm—was possible. 
Fourteen years before Bill Clinton was tabbed the “first Black Presi-
dent,” Mark L. Stebbins—a blue-eyed and light-skinned white councilman 
on the Stockton, California City Council—reverse passed from white to 




322. BAZ DREISINGER, NEAR BLACK: WHITE-TO-BLACK PASSING IN AMERICAN 
CULTURE 3 (2008). 
323. President Bill Clinton Interview, Jimmy Kimmel Live! (ABC television broadcast Apr. 3, 2014), 
http://abc.go.com/shows/jimmy-kimmel-live/news/news/140403-president-bill-clinton-interview 
[https://perma.cc/PGP3-K2JC] (discussing his feelings on being tabbed the first Black president). 
324. Suzy Hansen, Why Blacks Love Bill Clinton, SALON, (Feb. 20, 2002, 4:45 PM), 
http://www.salon.com/2002/02/21/clinton_88 [https://perma.cc/PN6S-X64D] (reporting 
on acclaimed author Toni Morrison, who suggested that Bill Clinton resonated with Black 
voters because “he hung out with black folk, he understood our music, he understood our 
culture and he understood how to connect”). 
325. Rich, supra note 144. 
326. See Jay Mathews, Hue and Cry; Blue-Eyed Official Ran as Black, Faces Recall, WASH. POST, 
May 6, 1984, at A1. 
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Stebbins reverse passed in order to resonate with minority voters, and ulti-
mately, claim a spot on the Stockton City Council: 
In 1983, Stebbins won election to the Stockton City Council in a 
largely black and Latino district.  During the campaign, when 
asked about his racial identity, he said he was black.  But after the 
election, one of his defeated opponents—a larger-than-life local 
figure named Ralph White, who called himself “the black messiah 
of Stockton”—argued that Stebbins should be recalled from office 
because he’d lied about his race and was actually white.327 
White called his political rival Stebbins “a white guy with a perm,” and 
alleged that he reverse passed as Black to “‘defraud[]’ District 9’s impover-
ished voters by pretending to share their minority heritage—a reverse case of 
trying to ‘pass.’”328  In addition, White procured a “birth certificate [that] 
listed both of [Stebbins’s] parents as white.”329 
Like Dolezal thirty years later,330 however, Stebbins maintained that he 
was Black despite the evidence produced against him.331  He based his self-
identification on past experiences of prejudice,332 and more than likely did so 
to win a seat on the Stockton City Council.  Following his outing, Stebbins 
unsuccessfully campaigned for seats on the City Council, School District, and 
East Water District, and for Mayor.333  Stebbins’s experiences illustrate that 
  
327. Ben Mathis-Lilley, An Interview With Mark Stebbins, the Original Rachel Dolezal, SLATE 
(June 15, 2015, 2:01 PM), http://www.slate.com/blogs/the_slatest/2015/06/15/mark_ 
stebbins_interview_rachel_dolezal_s_predecessor_in_racial_controversy.html 
[https://perma.cc/VQ7W-NW89]. 
328. Maria Wilhelm, Whether He’s Black or White, the Voters Want Stebbins to Stay, PEOPLE (June 
11, 1984), http://www.people.com/people/archive/article/0,,20088031,00.html [https:// 
perma.cc/7DHQ-G4U3]. 
329. Kennedy, supra note 5, at 1189; see also Wade Roberts, The ‘White’ Man Who Insisits He’s 
‘Black’, EBONY, June 1984, at 31. 
330. Stebbins’s similarities to Dolezal also include their peculiarly kindred geographic origins and 
shared commitment to civil rights, the latter of which served as the foundation of each’s self-
identification as Black.  Wilhelm, supra note 328.  “Born in the rural Washington town of 
Colville, [Stebbins] came to a gradual realization, he says, that he was wrongly labeled, in a 
racial sense.  At Washington State University he was active in the civil rights movement.  
He later enlisted in a variety of community organizing projects, arriving in Stockton in 1965 
to help with the United Farm Workers’ boycott.  About that time Stebbins decided he was 
black, ‘culturally, socially and genetically.’”  Id. 
331. Mathews, supra note 326. 
332. “Stebbins recalled that, because of his broad nose and curly hair, he faced taunts as a 
teenager in rural Washington state from classmates who sometimes referred to him as 
‘nigger hair.’”  Kennedy, supra note 5, at 1189. 
333. When asked whether he ran for public office after being outed as white, Stebbins replied: 
“Yes, but I wasn’t elected to any offices after that.  I ran for Stockton city mayor, I ran for 
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political reverse passing facilitated campaign victories and extended access to 
governmental positions that being a white man in a minority-majority district 
could not deliver him. 
Cultural reverse passing—for the purpose of obtaining political benefits—
is not limited to presidents, politicians, or governmental figures.  In fact, it may 
be a far more common phenomenon within the realm of non-governmental 
political spaces, and most notably, social movements, where racial identity may 
be at the core of political activism and advocacy.  Approximately two months 
after Rachel Dolezal’s reverse passing from white to Black was revealed, one 
of the Black Lives Matter’s most vocal and visible figures—Shaun King—
became the target of allegations that he too was a white man reverse passing 
as a Black man.334  On August 19, 2015, toward the close of an active summer 
for the Black Lives Matter Movement, Breitbart News claimed that one of its 
archetypal figures was lying about his biracial identity.  Breitbart procured 
King’s birth certificate, which documented that both of his legal parents were 
in fact white.335  The allegations set off a firestorm in social and mainstream 
media, intensified by similar debates about racial identity and its role in polit-
ical organizing following Dolezal’s reveal.336  Yet this time the debate in-
volved a familiar and national figure, deeply steeped in the “new civil rights 
movement”337—not a fringe, regional figure tucked far off in the Pacific 
Northwest. 
King built his prominent political profile overwhelmingly on his in-
volvement in the Black Lives Matter Movement, particularly “during the 
  
the school district, again for City Council, and I’d also run for Stockton East water district, 
so I’ve run for several offices.”  Mathis-Lilley, supra note 327. 
334. See Milo, Did Black Lives Matter Organizer Shaun King Mislead Oprah Winfrey by Pretending 
to Be Biracial?, BREITBART (Aug. 19, 2015), http://www.breitbart.com/big-government 
/2015/08/19/did-black-lives-matter-organiser-shaun-king-mislead-oprah-winfrey-by-
pretending-to-be-biracial [https://perma.cc/PZ93-V5TM]. 
335. King admitted that his mother is white, and “a birth certificate, which 
Breitbart . . . independently acquired from the Kentucky Office of Vital Statistics, names a 
white man as his father.”  Id. 
336. For an article that symbolizes the broader debate spurred by questions about King’s (and 
Dolezal’s) racial identity, and its implications on affirmative action, see Victor David 
Hanson, What Does the Modern Malleability of Gender and Race Mean for the Future of 
Affirmative Action, NAT’L REV. (Aug. 27, 2015, 12:00 AM), http://www.national 
review.com/article/423136/rachel-dolezal-caitlyn-jenner-race-gender 
[http://perma.cc/EW5A-ENRH]. 
337. Elizabeth Day, #BlackLivesMatter: The Birth of a New Civil Rights Movement, GUARDIAN 
(July 19, 2015, 5:00 AM), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jul/19/blacklives 
matter-birth-civil-rights-movement [https://perma.cc/7ERS-CAHT]. 
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2014 protests in Ferguson, [Missouri].”338  His grassroots activism contribut-
ed to his visibility, but it was King’s social media presence and activity (pri-
marily on Twitter) that garnered him hundreds of thousands of followers,339 
the esteem of other respected activists, and a prominent role within the Black 
Lives Matter Movement.340  Although difficult to assess, King’s representa-
tion that he was biracial—and more specifically, part Black—arguably played 
a pivotal role in mounting the sizable profile he possesses.341 Given the im-
portance of racial agency to serving a leading role in the broader Black Lives 
Matter Movement, King’s racial representations cannot be overstated. 
Thus, if King did in fact reverse pass as Black as a means of solidifying 
political legitimacy and resonance,342 building his profile and following, and 
seeking “praise[] as [a] hero of civil rights and social activism,”343 the incen-
tives for doing so are clear.  However, a day after allegations were made 
against King’s Blackness, he responded with a defense against the allega-
tions.344  King denied lying about racial identity,345 and penned a candid arti-
cle about the complex and peculiar backdrop of his racial identity, and 
claimed that he was in fact biracial.  King wrote: 
The reports about my race, about my past, and about the pain I’ve 
endured are all lies.  My mother is a senior citizen.  I refuse to 
  
338. Josh Sanburn, Why a Black Lives Matter Activist’s Race Is Under Scrutiny, TIME (Aug. 20, 
2015, 9:34 PM), http://time.com/4004830/shaun-king-race [http://perma.cc/ZZV7-
RGRP]. 
339. See @ShaunKing, TWITTER (July 10, 2016, 1:22 PM), https://twitter.com/ShaunKing 
[https://perma.cc/ASC5-MJE9]. 
340. See Katie Rogers, In Questions Over Shaun King’s Race, Activists See Challenge to Black Lives 
Matter Movement, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 21, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/ 
22/us/in-questions-over-shaun-kings-race-activists-see-challenge-to-black-lives-matter-
movement.html [https://perma.cc/WPK5-PRXF]. 
341. “Shaun King, who built a large online following during the 2014 protests in Ferguson, Mo. 
following the death of unarmed teenager Michael Brown, has long claimed to be of mixed 
race, saying his mother is white and his father is black.”  Sanburn, supra note 338. 
342. In addition, King’s self-identification as biracial (and Black) procured him a full-tuition 
scholarship at Morehouse University, a Historically Black College in Atlanta.  See Michele 
Gorman, Black Lives Matter Leader Shaun King Denies He Lied About Race and Assault, 
NEWSWEEK, (Aug. 20, 2015, 3:10 PM), http://www.newsweek.com/shaun-king-fires-
back-conservative-media-outlets-doubt-he-biracial-364595 [https://perma.cc/8AVT-
JR4T]. 
343. Yiannopoulos, supra note 334. 
344. Shaun King, Race, Love, Hate, and Me: A Distinctly American Story, DAILY KOS (Aug. 20, 
2015, 3:39 PM), http://www.dailykos.com/story/2015/08/20/1413881/-Race-love-hate-
and-me-A-distinctly-American-story [https://perma.cc/A9VV-JG7C]. 
345. Doug Criss & Dana Ford, Black Lives Matter Activist Shaun King Addresses Race Reports, 
CNN (Aug. 20, 2015, 8:32 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2015/08/20/us/shaun-king-
controversy [https://perma.cc/6DU8-3J9W]. 
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speak in detail about the nature of my mother’s past, or her sexual 
partners, and I am gravely embarrassed to even be saying this now, 
but I have been told for most of my life that the white man on my 
birth certificate is not my biological father and that my actual bio-
logical father is a light-skinned black man.  My mother and I have 
discussed her affair.346 
Like Dolezal, King maintained the position that he was Black.347  But by in-
troducing the story about his mother’s affair with “a light-skinned Black 
man,”348 he dismissed the allegations that he was lying about his race, and 
thus, reverse passing.  In the Era of Racial Self-Identification, however, 
whether King is telling the truth or not may not be pivotal, after all.  The law 
enables individuals to elect whatever race they so choose, even if they cannot 
anchor that selection with genealogical evidence.349 
Questions about King’s real racial identity persist.350  The debate about 
King’s racial identity sparked a discussion, and greater awareness within polit-
ical movements like the Black Lives Matter Movement, of the looming pos-
sibility of reverse passing, and its facilitation of organizational trespassing, 
capitalizing off of advocacy, and unseating Black activists and advocates from 
leadership roles. 
2. Social Benefits 
Social scientists have examined how racial self-identification is “often 
determined by association.”351  For well-known reverse passers like Dolezal or 
Smith, and unknown reverse passers who shed their white identity for a nonwhite 
  
346. King, supra note 344. 
347. Michele Gorman, Black Lives Matter Leader Shaun King Denies He Lied About Race and 
Assault, NEWSWEEK (Aug. 20, 2015, 3:10 PM), http://www.newsweek.com/shaun-king-
fires-back-conservative-media-outlets-doubt-he-biracial-364595 [https://perma.cc/DQP7-
DRMR]. 
348. King, supra note 344. 
349. King may very well not be a reverse passer, but many claim that he was indeed “accenting,” 
or highlighting a stigmatized identity or “preferred identity” (Black) while concealing or 
suppressing belonging to a non-stigmatized identity (white).  See Khanna & Johnson, supra 
note 3, at 386. 
350. A February 2016 social media exchange with prominent sports pundit Jason Whitlock 
highlights the looming suspicion around the authenticity of Shaun King’s racial identity.  See 
Carly Hoilman, ‘You’re White’: Black Sports Columnist Calls Out Shaun King in Series of Brutal 




351. Nix & Qian, supra note 51, at 12. 
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identity for social purposes, race by association and “selective association”—the 
friends, relationships and circles one keeps—serves as proxy for ancestral or bio-
logical connection to nonwhiteness.352  In some instances, race by association 
“trump[s] any other sort of physical or documentary evidence.”353 
Language, in addition to physical appearance, can be an integral perfor-
mance of identity in both the passing and reverse passing context.354  Adopt-
ing, and fluently deploying, nonwhite colloquialisms, slang, or argot, and, in 
addition, speaking a foreign language or perfecting an accent linked to a 
nonwhite group may be an integral component of the reverse passing.  Justice 
Kennedy, in Hernandez v. New York, even observed that, “for certain ethnic 
groups and in some communities . . . proficiency in a particular language, like 
skin color, should be treated as a surrogate for race under an equal protection 
analysis.”355 
In addition to physical spaces, there are also social incentives to reverse 
pass within virtual spaces.  Behind the keyboard, where one can select their 
own avatar, shape an identity, and hide behind the screen, social reverse pass-
ing online is a far easier proposition.356  And the gradual rise of social media as 
a space of interaction and engagement suggests a possible increase in inci-
dents of reverse passing. 
Virtual reverse passing takes place within online dating, social and polit-
ical forums, and chat forums.  The baselines incentivizing racial reverse pass-
ing within the various online spaces remain the same: Namely, reverse passing 
from white to Black, Latino, Arab or another nonwhite designation advances 
a subjective interest.  Within the dating space, for instance, a white male who 
chooses to socially reverse pass as “Latino” may do so to make himself appeal-
ing to a specific class of online prospects that designate that preference.357  
  
352. Khanna & Johnson, supra note 3, at 388. 
353. ARIELA J. GROSS, WHAT BLOOD WON’T TELL: A HISTORY OF RACE ON TRIAL IN 
AMERICA 96 (2008). 
354. See Yoshino, supra note 4, at 896–900. 
355. Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 371 (1991). 
356. See generally LISA NAKAMURA, CYBERTYPES: RACE, ETHNICITY, AND IDENTITY ON 
THE INTERNET (2002) for a comprehensive and descriptive examination of identity 
tourism, the use of racial avatars, and racial passing in chat rooms and online forums, as well 
as the other ways race and racial identity are flexibly deployed online.  For a legal analysis of 
how race is negotiated online, see Kang, supra note 28. 
357. This is particularly true if the reverse passer is a member of a specific ethnicity dating site, 
for example a Latino dating site like Latin American Cupid.  See Latin American Cupid, 
http://www.latinamericancupid.com [https://perma.cc/2XL3-VZC9].  Therefore, reverse 
passing may be a necessary step for de facto inclusion (or success) on such a dating site.  For 
an editorial citing the increased popularity of Latino dating sites, and their appeal with non-
Latinos, see generally Danielle Restuccia, Top Latino Online Dating Sites, HUFFINGTON 
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Social science research illustrates that racial concordance is heavily preferred 
with online daters, which encourages social reverse passing among white suit-
ors seeking to attract nonwhite prospects.358 
The same is true for social reverse passing within political discussion and 
organizing forums.  As illustrated by the Dolezal and King incidents, self-
identification as Black enhances the legitimacy, and may very well enhance 
the political influence, for example, of online reverse passers who present 
themselves as Black to resonate with Black Lives Matter activists and sympa-
thizers, or to undermine the movement; or a white online commentator who 
reverse passes as Native American to solidify herself as a native voice and pub-
lic intellectual on matters important to that population.359 
Whether on-the-ground or online, the Era of Racial-Identification cre-
ates almost unchecked latitude for individuals to racially identify as they see 
fit, and within an era where diversity is rewarded, in a fashion that advances 
their interests.  As discussed above, the social benefits and incentives pro-
cured through reverse passing are distinct, diverse, and numerous. 
IV. REVERSE PASSING AND TRANSRACIALISM 
I acknowledge that I was biologically born white to white parents, 
but I identify as black. 
—Rachel Dolezal360 
After nearly four months of silence, Dolezal admitted on November 2, 
2015 that she was born white.361  Despite these biological roots, however, she 
steadfastly maintained that she was a Black woman.362  This declaration ended 
  
POST (Dec. 16, 2013, 12:01 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/12/16/latino-
online-dating-_n_4453635.html [https://perma.cc/6DSW-DY5Y]. 
358. See generally Ken-Hou Lin & Jennifer Lundquist, Mate Selection in Cyberspace: The 
Intersection of Race, Gender, and Education, 119 AM. J. SOC. 183 (2013) (building 
upon a previous body of established sociological research finding that same-race preferences 
still predominate in online dating). 
359. Here, we are referring specifically to Andrea Smith, who was, before being revealed to be 
white, a common and frequent online commentator on Twitter.  She deactivated her 
Twitter account on June 30, 2015 (her former handle was @andrea366).  Jaschick, supra 
note 275. 
360. Maria Mercedes Lara, Rachel Dolezal Admits She Was ‘Biologically Born White’ but Maintains 
That She Identifies as Black, PEOPLE (Nov. 2, 2015, 2:55 PM), http://www.people. 
com/article/rachel-dolezal-admits-white-the-real-show-video [https://perma.cc/VV4H-
UMN4] (internal quotation marks omitted). 
361. See id. 
362. See id. 
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her reverse passing but birthed a new campaign: the idea that she could racial-
ly transition from white to Black.  This transition, from one race to another, is 
being dubbed by some in the media as “transracialism.” 
This Part considers the interplay between reverse passing and transra-
cialism.  It analyzes the roots of the term transracialism and argues that the 
phenomenon of reverse passing substantially expanded the boundaries of the 
original definition.  It also suggests that new and expanded definition of 
transracialism threatens to rewrite the rules of racial identification. 
A. Traditional Definition of Transracialism 
Prior to the Dolezal outing and the debate that it spawned, transracial-
ism was a term linked almost exclusively to situations in which parents adopt-
ed a child of a different race.363  Within that context, the term transracial was 
used to describe the lived experiences of children who were adopted into 
homes and raised by parents whose racial identification was phenotypically 
and culturally different from that of the child’s.364  The term “trans” when jux-
taposed against “racial” was meant to describe the process by which a 
nonwhite adopted child navigates a white racial and cultural familial context 
that is different from the one to which they are phenotypically and culturally 
viewed as belonging.365 
A derivative theory of transracialism emerged that also examined the ex-
periences of white siblings who grew up with transracial adoptees as siblings.  
The specific theory linked to this mode of transracialization suggests that 
phenotypically white siblings of transracial adoptees, such as Rachel Dolezal, 
whose family adopted two African-American children, are often forced to 
think about race in a different way as a result of viewing the experiences of 
their nonwhite adopted siblings.  They are said to “transcend the myth of 
color-blindness and come to a deeper understanding of the role of race and 
  
363. For an example in the legal literature, see generally Andrew Morrison, Transracial Adoption: 
The Pros and Cons and the Parents’ Perspective, 20 HARV. BLACKLETTER L.J. 167 (2004). 
364. See id. 
365. See, e.g., LisaMarie Rollins, Transracial Lives Matter: Rachel Dolezal and the Privilege of 
Racial Manipulation, HUFFINGTON POST (June 17, 2015, 3:23 PM), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/lisamarie-rollins/transracial-lives-matter-rachel-dolezal-
and-the-privilege-of-racial-manipulation_b_7599380.html [https://perma.cc/LP2M-
WAEZ] (describing transracialism as “navigat[ing] [her] blackness . . . inside an oftentimes 
racist, religious, violent and rigid white world. . . . [while] living in a house and community 
that simultaneously erased [her], racialized [her] and tokenized [her]”). 
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discrimination based on color-consciousness in our society.”366  Transracializa-
tion purportedly results in the white siblings of transracial adoptees being more 
likely to “maintain connections to communities of color through their ongoing 
friendships, romantic involvements, and membership in integrated or pre-
dominately people of color organizations.”367  Finally, those whites who have 
been transracialized are said to be “more aware of racism and more committed 
to interrupting it.”368 
Thus, the concept of transracialism originated in the context of cross-
racial adoptions by white parents.  The term was used to describe the lived 
experiences of transracial adoptees.  Additional derivative theories were also 
developed to describe the effect of such adoptions on white siblings.  As dis-
cussed in the Part that follows, the concept of transracialism and its theoreti-
cal derivatives are now being expanded beyond these original parameters, and 
are being used to rewrite the rules of and significance of racial identification. 
B. Reverse Passing and the Expanded Definition of Transracialism 
In essence, reverse passers seek to transcend, pierce, and redefine racial 
boundaries.  Indeed, most cases of passing, whether traditional or reverse, 
“involve exaggerated and sometimes caricatured negotiations of racial 
boundaries.”369  This was certainly the case with Dolezal, particularly after 
her reverse passing deception was put to an end. 
Dolezal’s outing was immediately followed by a public conversation about 
transracialism.  Yet the transracial possibilities that Dolezal ushered into the 
American imagination were extrapolated further than the context of transra-
cial adoptees and their white siblings.  Transracialism was instead analogized 
to trans-sexuality,370 and for some pundits, offered more evidence of a “‘post-
race’ society.”371  The ability of one individual to desert her biological race for 
  




369. Dreisinger, supra note 322, at 4. 
370. See, e.g., Evan Urquhart, It Isn’t Crazy to Compare Rachel Dolezal With Caitlyn Jenner, SLATE 
(June 15, 2015, 12:47 PM), http://www.slate.com/blogs/outward/2015/06/15/rachel_ 
dolezal_caitlyn_jenner_how_transgender_is_different_from_transracial.html 
[https://perma.cc/X6N3-2Y6Y]. 
371. Sara P. Díaz, Opinion, Solidarity With Rachel Dolezal’s Cause: Don’t Let Important Message Be 
Drowned Out, SEATTLE TIMES (June 15, 2015, 2:44 PM), http://www.seattletimes. 
com/opinion/solidarity-with-rachel-dolezal-dont-let-important-message-be-drowned-out 
[https://perma.cc/BN9W-D36F]. 
350 64 UCLA L. REV. 282 (2017) 
 
another, particularly the very classification situated on the opposite end of the 
American racial spectrum, defied the discursive and legal bounds of how race 
was previously understood. 
The new definition of transracialism undeniably stretched the bounds of 
its original definition.  More specifically, it was broadened to stand for the 
proposition that a person can believe they are a different race than what they 
were at birth—that they can assume a different racial identity by expressing 
an affinity or a belief that a race other than the one they are phenotypically 
better embodies who they are as a person.  This definition of transracialism 
gained much traction after Dolezal’s outing, particularly within social and 
mainstream media forums, and was undoubtedly fertilized by the seeds of 
post-racialism that have recently littered the public discourse.372 
Importantly, while the discourses converged and the concepts are relat-
ed, transracialism is distinct from “post-racialism.”373  The former denotes an 
individual’s transition from one racial identity to another, while the latter re-
fers to (American) society’s departure from a time in which race is salient and 
racism relevant.  However, the dialectic between the two is of crucial im-
portance.  Particularly as they intersect, the growing notion that an individual 
can transition from one race to another is used as evidence of America’s col-
lective transition toward post-racialism. 
C. The Implications of Reverse Passing and Transracialism 
As discussed throughout this Article, the Era of Racial Self-
Identification, established by administrative deference and subjective deter-
mination, facilitated reverse passing.  The fluid movement from white to 
nonwhite enabled by legal and cultural passing gave birth to important scholarly 
conversations about transracialism, particularly as it was defined in the preceding 
Part.374  It also spurred conversations regarding whether transitioning from 
one race to another was not only possible, but also viable and desirable. 
  
372. See, e.g., Ian F. Haney López, Post-Racial Racism: Racial Stratification and Mass Incarceration 
in the Age of Obama, 98 CAL. L. REV. 1023, 1069 (2010) (describing post-racial era social 
consensus that “racial inequalities flow from nonracist factors, whether private choices 
aggregated by the market, cultural predilections, or real racial differences that form 
inescapable facts of life”). 
373. See generally Sumi Cho, Post-Racialism, 94 IOWA L. REV. 1589 (2009) (framing post-
racialism as a twenty-first century ideology that dismisses the salience of race as a strategy to 
eschew racial progress). 
374. Prior to the Dolezal outing and the debate her outing spawned, transracialism was a term 
linked almost exclusively to parents adopting a child of a different race.  For an example in  
the legal literature, see generally Morrison, supra note 363. 
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It is important to note that the fluidity of race and racial identity, 
while recently thrust into mainstream discourse, is established within legal 
scholarship.  As examined in Part I, courts during the Era of Top-Down Racial 
Assignment vacillated between a range of metrics—spanning science to pheno-
type—to define and redefine race and racial categories.  Transracialism and its 
advocates adopt narrower definitions of race that link it to either: (1) cul-
ture, (2) phenotype, or (3) both culture and phenotype.375  Furthermore, as il-
lustrated in Camille Rich’s work, the “elective race” legal regime also makes 
transracialism possible from a formal perspective.376 
However, the possibility of transracialism is punctured by American ra-
cial history and its one-directional access.  As examined in Part I, whiteness 
was carefully constructed in narrow and exclusive terms.  Judicial protection 
of whiteness limited a range of people from legally claiming it; particularly 
those with darker skin, especially African-Americans: 
Whiteness in this country has historically been incredibly narrowly 
drawn to protect its purity, and this was not simply enforced by so-
cial mores, but also by law.  Conversely, blackness was broadly 
drawn, serving as something of a collecting pool for anyone with 
even the most minute detectable and provable Negro ancestry.  If 
you weren’t 100 percent white, you were black.377 
Thus, from an accessibility standpoint, claims to transracial identity are 
overwhelmingly limited to whites seeking to adopt nonwhite classifications.  
The reverse seldom, if ever, occurs.  Because of the narrowness in which 
whiteness has always been defined, it is unlikely that those with darker skin 
will be able to exploit transracialism as a means of adopting a white identity in 
order to reap its attendant range of privileges. 
To be sure, reverse passing and transracialism pose very real yet hidden 
dangers to historically marginalized people of color.  As noted above, by its 
very nature, transracialism is available and utilized primarily by whites.  
Whites can use principles of transracialism to reverse pass and take advantage of 
the benefits of race-conscious affirmative action programs, to the exclusion of 
people of color who have historically been and continue to be denied meaning-
ful access to important institutions and programs.  Furthermore, a primary 
danger posed by transracialism is its shoring up of white privilege: “If anything, 
to believe that one can transfer one’s identity in this way is a privilege—maybe 
  
375. For a critical analysis of how both culture and phenotype are manipulated to transcend race, 
focusing on Dolezal, see Blow, supra note 14. 
376. See generally Rich, supra note 56. 
377. Blow, supra note 14. 
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even the highest manifestation of white privilege.”378  The act itself is evi-
dence of that privilege, and increased exercise of reverse passing by whites en-
hances white supremacy by shifting the sparse resources reserved for 
nonwhites into the hands of whites. 
Importantly, for nonwhites, “race has never represented a mere decorative 
symbol . . . . Instead, race has always carried with it real substantive consequences 
for the lives of people of color, who generally endure some form of racial subor-
dination on a daily basis.”379  Neither reverse passing nor transracialism will 
disrupt this paradigm.  Instead, transracialism—with its one-way street of 
self-identification for whites—and reverse passing—which will enable white 
people who can perform a nonwhite identity to reap the benefits afforded by 
the increased push for diversity—will merely reify the existing racial order, 
and further bolster the privileges and power attendant with whiteness. 
Put another way, while both transracialism and reverse passing appear to 
move us closer to a racial utopia where nonwhite identity is equally as valuable 
as white identity, the two concepts are in reality part and parcel of the same 
system of racial domination:  A system in which the interests of nonwhites can 
be exploited, and access to meaningful institutions and opportunities for them 
is further diminished.  For these reasons, reverse passing and the new theory of 
transracialism that it is spawning should be viewed with great caution. 
CONCLUSION 
I’m just not impressed by the fact that—that the University of Texas 
may have fewer [Black students if the admissions policy changes].  
Maybe it ought to have fewer. 
—Justice Antonin Scalia, Fisher v. University of Texas II380 
This Article coins and advances a theory of reverse passing.  It demon-
strates how the Supreme Court’s Fourteenth Amendment affirmative action 
jurisprudence has upended the traditional racial hierarchy in which white ra-
cial identities are afforded the highest values and variations of nonwhite racial 
identities are afforded the lowest values.  It does so by creating an increased 
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Reverse Passing 353 
 
 
value in diversity, conceptualized to mean nonwhiteness.  The increased value 
in diversity has generated a demand for nonwhite individuals in education, 
employment, and beyond, thereby providing an incentive for whites to reverse 
pass for purposes of reaping the benefits of the increased push for diversity in 
all realms of American society. 
On its face, the increased value afforded nonwhiteness appears to por-
tend a positive signal for the malleability of racial identity, particularly break-
ing down the racial caste that marks nonwhite identities as inferior and less 
valuable. Upon closer examination, however, the increased value afforded to 
nonwhiteness is a situational one.  It does not take into account the real sali-
ence of race, particularly the very real lived experience and historical discrimi-
nation faced by nonwhite individuals.  Instead, the increased value afforded 
diversity reduces nonwhite racial identities into culture and phenotype.  It is 
divorced from any concrete notion of the need for corrective or restorative 
justice based on a history of discrimination against minorities and is concep-
tualized only on terms that are satisfactory to mainstream institutions. 
The dangers of nonwhiteness being valued on the aforementioned terms 
are best exemplified by Fisher v. University of Texas at Austin (Fisher II), in 
which the constitutionality of Texas’s affirmative action program was chal-
lenged once again.381  During oral argument, a number of justices questioned 
the real value of admitting nonwhite students, with one of the justices implicitly 
suggesting that a race-conscious admissions program could only be justifiable if 
nonwhites added some performative value to classes.382  Such reasoning is 
anathema to the original purposes of race-conscious affirmative action pro-
grams.383  It does not acknowledge the reparatory purposes that are really at 
the heart of the need for affirmative action programs.  Instead, it only allows 
nonwhites to gain access to institutions if they can perform a prescribed racial 
identity, or put another way, “sing for their supper.”384  Such a conceptualiza-
tion of the value of nonwhite identities also allows whites to perform a 
nonwhite identity either phenotypically or culturally, or in other words, to re-
verse pass. 
  
381. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Fisher II, 136 S. Ct. 2198 (2016) (No. 14-981) (“Petition 
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physics class?”). 
383. See infra Part II.A. 
384. In other words, perform racial identity in line with the expectations of the institution, as a 
means toward gaining access to that institution. 
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For those reasons, the Court’s Fourteenth Amendment affirmative ac-
tion jurisprudence not only incentivizes reverse passing, but also narrows the 
terms upon which nonwhite persons are conceptualized as valuable.  And val-
uable not for their own sake, but the educational benefits of their nonwhite 
classmates, thereby negating both the salience of racial identity and the re-
storative justice rationales for maintaining race-conscious affirmative action 
programs.  Given that the Court in Fisher II did not upend the diversity doc-
trine that enables and incentivizes reverse passing, the number of whites un-
seating nonwhites from colleges, law schools, professorships, and political 
posts, threatens to continue to climb upwards. 
